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NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
Mark Savage*
It has been said that truth is stranger than fiction; but let us
begin with fiction.
There had been changes in the land. The great cat
stalked the new slate tombstone through the snow.
Around the field of whiteness, in magnificent oblivious
audience, stood a thin border of naked birch and
maple, without shadows. Anna watched the sweep of
the catamount across the drifts of soft, frozen tears.
The field was sacred-her husband was buried here.
She had buried him at home in the land of Vermont,
not in a matrix of military white tombstones.
Two hundred thirty-six thousand, nine hundred
eighteen American soldiers had died in Namibia during
the war in 1994. In ships the dead came across the
Atlantic Ocean and settled, like colonists, upon land
that no one, in innocence, had expected them to take.
All of the heartache burst into rage. The Congress
which had voted and the President who had com-
manded, they worried. Their words quickened with
sympathy for the nameless veils of black. They decided
to receive evidence about the practical effects of the
war, to determine a program which would order and
minimize them, and to budget the necessary monies.
The government suffered the universal ailment of
governments, a disease of the heart: It had never been
there. It had not seen. It is distinctly a politician's
point of view that the wrath of Achilles belongs on
the battlefields, and so Congress was not prepared for
the anger it refused to face. It is a distinctly masculine
point of view that Athena was born from the head of
Zeus, that wisdom and justice derive from power;
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Congress relied upon its power to determine the justice
it would mete.
The United States Treasury did not have any money
for the veterans and their families. War had both
mirrored and set the budgetary priorities for years to
come. Congress pondered an alternative source of
wealth, land, and decided to allocate land to the vet-
erans, to the heirs of the dead, and to the disabled.
The bill was simple: The United States would ex-
ercise its power as sovereign to appropriate Vermont,
in fee simple absolute, and would remove the citizens
of Vermont to portions of Oklahoma, Kansas, Mon-
tana, Idaho, Colorado, and South Dakota, which the
United States would also take. It would then divide
Vermont into 1,000,000 parcels and would convey title
to each veteran or heir.
The former Vermonters would become wards of the
United States for two decades. Congress would ensure
its power as guardian by retaining the fee to their new
lands; each displaced Vermonter would have a right
of occupancy superior to any other claim, but Con-
gress could terminate this subordinate right of occu-
pancy at will, without consent. Thus the United States
would also have the power to make the most produc-
tive and efficient use of the land in forming new
communities for the benefit of the former Vermonters.
They, in turn, could not sell their new homesteads,
disrupt the economies and polities of the several states,
and thereby defeat the federal effort to contain the
situation.
Robed in its plenary power, Congress would first
choose the new state citizenship and community for
each Vermonter and form the constitutions of their
local governments. In order to hasten the transition
and protect the interests of its wards, Congress would
necessarily legislate all matters. The dictates of federal
policy and national priorities would supplant the oth-
erwise inevitable and intolerable disputes among pri-
vate individuals.
The plaints sounded forth across America, with the
roots of protest in the seven states directly affected.
A rather bizarre congregation of liberals, conserva-
tives, and libertarians brought suit in federal court,
carefully enumerating the contraventions of the Con-
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stitution and the Bill of Rights. Anna suffered the
irony: her sacred land to be taken by sacrilege.
Perhaps readers have searched this tale for more than it is-
have compared it with reality and found it absurd. On the
contrary, a resplendent multitude of federal statutes and an
august line of opinions by the Supreme Court of the United
States declare that the Constitution bestows upon the United
States exactly these powers over Native Americans. Congress
has plenary power to legislate the form of government of Native
Americans.' Congress has plenary power to determine whether
a "tribe" does or does not exist and whether a Native American
is or is not a citizen of it.2 The United States has plenary power
to control the property rights and relations of Native Americans.3
1. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978) ("Congress
has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government");
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1902); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 384 (1896); cf. Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897) ("The only restriction
on the power of the Chickasaw Nation to legislate in respect of its internal affairs is
that such legislation shall not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States
2. E.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46, 47 (1913) ("Of course, it is
not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of people within the
range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect
of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for what
time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardi-
anship and protection of the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not
by the courts."); see Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85-86
(1977); Chippewa Indians v. United States, 307 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1939) (by implication);
Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423 (1907); Blue Jacket v. Board of Comm'rs [The
Kansas Indians], 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1867). Congress can even define
"Indian." See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1978).
3. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (dictum) ("Indian
tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy"); Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955) (Congress has plenary authority
to manage and control all Native American lands of aboriginal title, including termi-
nation of title, and no right of compensation exists unless a treaty or statute authorizes
it); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 106 n.28 (1949); id. at 103 (dictum)
(reservation created by executive order entails no "right of use or occupancy" and the
United States may terminate the interest without compensation); Sioux Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 331 (1942) (President or Congress may terminate at will
without compensation any proprietary interest of Native Americans in reservations
created by executive order-23 million acres, 67 CoNo. Rac. 10,913 (1926) (statement
of Senator Bratton)); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (Native
American tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the consent of the United
States, and under their authority"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
17 (1831) ("They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take effect in point of possession, when their right of possession ceases.");
Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
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The power of Congress can reach all social, cultural, economic,
political, and personal facets of Native Americans' lives.4 Even
when the United States conferred citizenship upon Native Amer-
icans by statute, such citizenship did not defeat these powers.
Native Americans are not citizens in a constitutional sense.'
Their statutory citizenship is not inconsistent or incompatible
with federal guardianship and protection of Native Americans
and their property, nor with tribal self-government.6 Congress
may choose whether to relinquish its guardianship and control
of Native Americans, in whole or in part, granting them all
rights and responsibilities or effecting only partial emancipation.
7
The truth, however, is stranger than fiction: The Constitution
never conferred such power over Native Americans. Two hun-
dred years of decisions by the Supreme Court and legislation
by Congress and the President lack constitutional authority. The
article below details the research and reasons for this thesis. It
offers the legal historian a much different analysis of the status
of Native Americans under state and federal law, and it provides
the advocate with new arguments and evidence to challenge
exercises of state and federal power over Native Americans and
Native American lands.
L Introduction
The alchemy of American history has yielded several legal
principles about Native Americans: Ours is not a federal system
comprising only state and national governments, but a tripartite
order. Native American tribes constitute a unique, third categbry
within our federal system, "domestic dependent nations ... in
4. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) ("undisputed fact
that Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters,
including their form of government"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379
(1886) ("the power of regulating their internal and social relations").
5. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (amend. XIV, § 1 does not confer citizenship
upon Native Americans); see Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04 (1857)
(dictum); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-62 (1832) (Native Americans
were "a people distinct from" those of the states and the United States, with a right
of self-government); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831)
(Cherokees were not "foreign nations" nor "citizens" within meaning of art. III and
were distinguished from "our own citizens").
6. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653-54 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber,
318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47-48 (1913); Tiger
v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315-16 (1911).
7. E.g., United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1917); United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916).
[Vol. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/3
No. 1] THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
a state of pupilage," not foreign nations nor states of the United
States.8 (Unfortunately, standard texts on constitutional law omit
to treat this tertiary status of Native Americans under the Con-
stitution. 9) Within this tripartite order, Congress enjoys a plenary
power over Native Americans, a power originally without sub-
stantive check by the Constitution or judicial review in the
Supreme Court.10 (While Congress' power remains "plenary,"
the Court has grafted some constitutional limits upon it.") The
resultant law of the United States has been fickle in its conces-
sion of rights to Native Americans, alternating between assimi-
lation, paternalism, and exclusion. 1
2
It is well demonstrated that the Constitution did not embrace
the ideal of liberty. Instead, the Framers effected a compromise
of ideal liberty and actual property and expressly preserved a
property right in slaves. 3 The adulteration was not unique, in
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17, 19-20 (1831).
9. None of the cited casebooks on constitutional law treats the rights or the status
of Native Americans under the Constitution. See E. BAREr & W. CoHMN, CONsT -
TUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1981) (not treating the status of Native Americans under the
Constitution); P. BRESr & S. LaviNsON, PROCESSES OF CONsrrunoNAL DEcisIoNMKINo
(2d ed. 1983) (same); P. FREuND, A. SumEwN, M. HowE & E. BROWN, CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1977) (same); G. GuNTHER, CoNsmTrrioNA. LAw 25, 39 (lth
ed. 1985) (same); W. LoCKHART, Y. KmiSAR & J. CHoPER, CoNSTrrUTONAL LAw (5th
ed. 1980) (same); G. STONE, L. SEmmAN, C. SuNsrmN & M. TusHNnr, CoNsTrruioNAL
LAW (1986) (same); cf. P. KAuPER, CoNsTITUTONAL LAw 479-80, 493, 539 n.c, 1346
(4th ed. 1972) (treating the status of Native Americans under the Constitution in a few
brief notes).
10. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) ("undisputed fact that Congress has plenary
authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their form of
government"); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority
over the tribal relations of Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning,
and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by
the judicial department of the government."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 559 (1832) ("[The Constitution] confers on congress the powers of war and peace;
of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required
for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any
restrictions on their free actions; the shackles imposed on this [legislative] power, in the
confederation [under the Articles of Confederation], are discarded.").
11. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDA. INDIN LA W 217-29 (R.
Strickland ed. 1982) (discussing the Constitution and the doctrine of trust responsibility
as limits upon the federal power to reach the affairs of Native Americans).
12. See generally 1-2 F. PRUCHA, THE GRAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNmENT AND THE AmERIcAN INDiANs (1984).
13. Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles,
99 HARv. L. Rv. 4, 4-5 (1985); W. WmcEx, TH SouRcEs OF ANTISLAvERY CoNsTI-
TuTioNALism iN AmECA, 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977); Finkelman, Slavery and the
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quality or degree. We have also arrogated the liberty and prop-
erty of Native Americans, under color of the Constitution. 4
This arrogation, however, was no part of the original under-
standing. Perhaps "[ilt was not that the Indian cause meant
less, but that the Union meant more."'"
If the United States-the Congress, the President, the Supreme
Court-has any authority with respect to Native Americans, the
Constitution must confer it. Any such provision at one and the
same time establishes and limits the scope of the power. Not-
withstanding assignations of a plenary power to the United
States, it remains competent to inquire whether the Constitution
confers it or whether subsequent legislative or judicial glosses
on the Constitution have, because "the Union meant more,"
concocted the power.
Inquiry into the original understanding about Native Ameri-
cans takes three forms. What does the text of the Constitution
state and mean (with due respect for historical variations in
meanings of words)? What did the Framers intend-to what
motives did they give effect through the text? What powers does
the structure of the Constitution necessarily imply, and did the
Framers necessarily intend, without declaring them?
16
Analysis of the text of the Constitution and the recorded
debates at the Federal Convention in Part II indicates that, in
the original understanding, the Constitution never conferred
upon the United States a plenary power over Native Americans.
Because the Constitution and those debates omit any discussion
of Native American lands in the Western Territory-lands which
the colonists coveted and often claiied for their own-this
Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:
ORIGNS OF TEE CONSTITUTON AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188 (R. Beeman, S.
Botein &c E. Carter II eds. 1987); see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV,
§ 2, #'1. 3 (1789, repealed by amend. XIII (1865)); 1 TiE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTioN OF 1787, at 594 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) (July 12, 1787) (statement of
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina, that "property in slaves should not be
exposed to danger under a Govt. instituted for the protection of property.") [hereinafter
RECORDS].
14. See generally 1-2 F. PRUCIA, supra note 12.
15. Strickland, The Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American Indian
Struggling with Ape on Tropical Landscape: An Afterword, 31 ME. L. Rav. 213, 220-
21 (1)79) (describing the contemporary attitude towards Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
16. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980). This inquiry does not resolve the prior question, how should
the original understanding inform subsequent interpretation of the Constitution?
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article also considers in Part III whether any unstated under-
standings existed about federal sovereignty over Native American
lands and thus whether any powers over Native Americans were
implicit in, without being expressly conferred by, the Constitu-
tion.
II. The Text and the Framers' Intents
When the chosen statesmen assembled in Philadelphia in 1787,
the slate was not clean. The Declaration of Independence had
already complained about Native Americans: "He [King George
III] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has
endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the
merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an
undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.'
' 7
The Articles of Confederation had conferred authority with
respect to Native Americans:
No State shall engage in any war without the consent
of the United States, in Congress assembled, unless
such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall
have received certain advice of a resolution being
formed br some nation of Indians to invade such
State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit
of a delay till the United States, in Congress assem-
bled, can be consulted .... 18
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also
have the sole and exclusive right and power of ...
regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians not members of any of the States; provided
that the legislative right of any State within its own
limits be not infringed or violated .... 19
Lastly, certain states were encroaching upon this exclusive fed-
eral power to regulate the trade and manage all affairs with the
Native Americans who were not members of the states-one of
the problems which caused the states to convene the Federal
Convention in order to revise the Articles of Confederation) °
17. The Declaration of Independence para. 29 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 5 J.
CoNTNMNTAL CONG. 510, 513 (W. Ford ed. 1906) (July 4, 1776).
18. The Articles of Confederation art. VI, para. 5 (U.S. 1781), reprinted in 9 J.
CoNTnacr AL CoNo. 907, 912 col. 2 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (Nov. 15, 1777).
19. The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4, reprinted in 9 J. CONTINNTAL
CONG. at 919, col. 2.
20. E.g., 1 RECoRDs, supra note 13, at 316 (June 19, 1787) (statement of James
Madison, Virginia).
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The Framers steeped themselves for four months in arguments
from historical example, political theory, American character,
and regional economics. They eventually treated Native Ameri-
cans in two constitutional provisions, the three-fifths clause and
the Indian commerce clause:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians
not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
21
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]"
A. The Three-Fifths Clause
The Virginia Plan for a constitution, presented by Edmund
Randolph to the Federal Convention on May 29, 1787, did not
mention Native Americans among its resolutions. "Y On June 11,
the Committee of the Whole House To Consider of the State
of the American Union debated anew the second resolution of
the plan concerning the "rights of suffrage in the National
LegisIature."u A motion was made to resolve "that the right
of suffrage in [the first branch of] the national Legislature ought
not to be according the [sic] rule established in the articles of
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of repre-
sentation."' 5 A subsequent motion proposed to define "equitable
ratio of representation" by subjoining
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
22. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. See The Virginia Plan (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13,
at 20-23.
24. The Virginia Plan, supra note 23, para. 2 ("Resd. therefore that the rights of
suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contri-
bution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases.").
.25. 1 REcoaDs, supra note 13, at 196, 200 (June 11, 1787) (motion of Rufus King,
Massachusetts, and James Wilson, Pennsylvania). The Articles of Confederation had
provided that, "In determining questions in the United States, in Congress assembled,
each State shall have one vote." The Articles of Confederation art. V, para. 4 (U.S.
1781), reprinted in 9 J. CoNm NrAL CoNe. 907, 910 col. 2 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (Nov. 15,
1777).
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in proportion to the whole number of white & other
free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition
including those bound to servitude for a term of years
and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended
in the foregoing description, except Indians[, not pay-
ing taxes[] in each State.26
This definition and its reference to "Indians" repeated a prin-
ciple of apportionment included in the first and second drafts
of the Articles of Confederation (which the final version had
deleted) and subsequently proposed as an amendment to the
Articles of Confederation in 1783.27
26. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 201 (June 11, 1787) (motion of James Wilson,
Pennsylvania, and Charles Pinckney, South Carolina). Mr. Madison originally described
the substance of the motion, but subsequently inserted the motion (but not verbatim)
from Journal, Acts and Proceedings, of the Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia,
Monday, May 14, and Dissolved Monday, September 17, 1787, which formed the Con-
stitution of the United States 111-12 (1819) ("In proportion to the whole number of
white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including
those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each
state."). 1 Racomns, supra note 13, at 201 n.10 (editor's note). The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 reprints the motion as published in the minutes of the
secretary, William Jackson, with the comma after "Indians," not after "taxes." Id. at
193. Therefore its reprint of Mr. Madison's revision is amended with brackets so to
reflect. This punctuation in the secretary's minutes and the revision of Mr. Madison's
quotation are both consistent with the Report of the Committee of the Whole House
To Consider of the State of the American Union, which reported to the Federal
Convention for its consideration the amended and adopted resolutions of the Virginia
Plan. See infra note 29.
27. The Articles of Confederation (first draft), art. XI, reprinted in 5 J. CoNrI-
NENTA. CONo. 546, 548 (W. Ford ed. 1906) (July 12, 1776) ("which shall be supplied
by the several Colonies in Proportion to the Numbers of Inhabitants of every Age, Sex
and Quality, except Indians not paying Taxes, in each Colony, .... ") [hereinafter
Articles of Confederation-First Draft]; The Articles of Confederation (second draft),
art. XI, reprinted in 5 J. CoNTmMrNAL CONG. 674, 677-78 col. 2 (W. Ford ed. 1906)
(Aug. 20, 1776) ("which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the
number of inhabitants of every age, sex and quality except Indians not paying taxes,
in each State ..... ") [hereinafter Articles of Confederation-Second Draft]; Resolution
of Apr. 18, 1783, reprinted in 24 J. CoN'rmENT CoNG. 256, 260 (G. Hunt ed. 1922).
The amendment proposed in 1783 would have employed the principle to apportion
among the thirteen states requisitions for the federal treasury,
which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the whole
number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex
and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years,
and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing
description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; ....
Id. During the formulation of the proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation,
no discussion of the term "Indians" was had. See 24 J. CoNrnmrTA CONG. 256-61
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The Committee of the Whole House adopted this same ratio
of representation among the states for the second branch of the
national legislature.2 Its final report to the Federal Convention,
on June 13, 1787, confirmed this reference to Native Ameri-
cans.2 9 (The second and third resolutions of the Virginia Plan
were renumbered the seventh and eighth resolutions of the re-
port.)
In opposition to the Virginia Plan, William Paterson of New
Jersey proposed the New Jersey Plan to the Federal Convention
on June 15, 1787. The New Jersey Plan included a similar clause,
which likewise mentioned "Indians," but the clause defined the
ratio of requisitions from the states by the general government,
not the ratio of representation among the states. 30 The Com-
mittee of the Whole House decided not to refer the New Jersey
Plan to the Federal Convention.31
(G. Hunt ed. 1922) (Apr. 18, 1783); Address to the States, by the United States in
Congress Assembled, reprinted in 24 J. CoNINETAL CoNo. 277-83 (G. Hunt ed. 1922)
(Apr. 26, 1783).
Messrs. Randolph and Wilson subsequently referred to this resolution and definition
when discussing the one then before the Federal Convention. I REcoRDs, supra note
13, a't 594, 595 (July 12, 1787).
28. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 202 (June 11, 1787) (motion of James Wilson,
Pennsylvania, and Alexander Hamilton, New York).
29. Some punctuation differed, but the pertinent phrase remained "and three fifths
of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not
paying taxes in each State." State of the Resolutions Submitted to the Consideration
of the House by the Honorable Mr[.] Randolph, as Altered, Amended, and Agreed to
in a Committee of the Whole House [To Consider of the State of the American Union]
para. 7 (June 13, 1787), reprinted in I REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 228, 229; see also
[Preliminary] State of the Resolutions Submitted to the Consideration of the House by
the Honorable Mr[.] Randolph, as Agreed to in a Committee of the Whole House [To
Consider of the State of the American Union] (June 11, 1787), reprinted in 1 R coRDs,
supr,' note 13, at 224, 227. Mr. Madison quoted the phrase in the "Report of the
Committee of Whole on Mr. Randolphs propositions" as "& three fifths of all other
persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes
in each State." Id. at 236.
'10. The New Jersey Plan para. 3 (June 15, 1787) ("Resd. that whenever requisitions
shall be necessary, instead of the rule making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Congs. be authorized to make such requisitions in
proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants of every
age sex and condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three
fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians
not paying taxes; .... "), reprinted in 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 242, 243 (June 15,
1787). Thus the New Jersey Plan incorporated the proposed amendment of article VIII
of the Articles of Confederation, which would have employed this principle to apportion
requisitions among the states. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
31. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 322 (June 19, 1787) (motion of Rufus King,
Massachusetts).
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This clause became part of the basic debate about represen-
tation in the Congress, the debate that ultimately yielded to the
"Great Compromise." Throughout these deliberations about the
nature of representation in Congress and whether to adopt the
seventh resolution (which excepted "Indians"), however, Native
Americans were not mentioned once as people to be repre-
sented.
3 2
Having bandied the proper ratio of representation without
resolution, the Federal Convention formed and referred the
seventh resolution to a committee comprising one delegate from
each state.33 This committee adopted the clause, for its report
to the Federal Convention specified representation in terms of
"inhabitants of the description reported in the 7th Resolution
of the Come. of the whole House. ' 34 After further deliberation,
the Federal Convention installed and referred the clause to
another committee.35 This committee reformulated the ratio of
32. See id. at 436-38 (June 27, 1787) (delegates did not discuss Native Americans
at all and, a fortiori, did not mention them as subjects of representation); id. at 444-
52 (June 28, 1787) (same); id. at 461-70 (June 29, 1787) (same); id. at 481-93 (June 30,
1787) (same); id. at 510-16 (July 2, 1787) (same); id. at 522-23 (July 3, 1787) (same);
id. at 526-34 (July 5, 1787) (same); id. at 540-47 (July 6, 1787) (same); id. at 549-53
(July 7, 1787) (same); id. at 559-62 (July 9, 1787) (same); id. at 566-71 (July 10, 1787)
(same); id. at 578-88 (July 11, 1787) (same); id. at 591-97 (July 12, 1787) (same); id. at
600-06 (July 13, 1787) (same); 2 id. at 2-11 (July 14, 1787) (same); id. at 15-20 (July 16,
1787) (same). See also infra note 45 & text accompanying note 47.
33. 1 RacoRDs, supra note 13, at 511, 516 (July 2, 1787) (motion of Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina, and Caleb Strong, Massachusetts, to refer the
clause to the Committee of the Federal Convention to Whom Were Referred the Eighth
Resolution and Such Part of the Seventh Resolution As Had Not Already Been Decided
On); id. at 517, 519-20 (July 2, 1787) (same).
34. Report of the Committee of the Federal Convention to Whom Were Referred
the Eighth Resolution and Such Part of the Seventh Resolution As Had Not Already
Been Decided On by the Committee of the Whole House (July 3, 1787), reprinted in I
REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 526 (July 3, 1787); id. at 523 (July 3, 1787). The seventh
resolution stated:
Resolved. that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national
Legislature 6ught ... to be ... in proportion to the whole number of
white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and
condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and
three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing de-
scription, except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.
State of the Resolutions Submitted to the Consideration of the House by the Honorable
Mr[.] Randolph, as Altered, Amended, and Agreed to in a Committee of the Whole
House, supra note 29, para. 7.
35. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 540, 542 (July 6, 1787) (motion of Gouverneur
Morris, Pennsylvania, and James Wilson, Pennsylvania, to refer the clause to the
Committee of Five Members to Whom Was Referred the First Clause of the First
Proposition Reported from the Grand Committee).
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representation. It deleted the extant formula, including "and
three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the fore-
going description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each
State," 3 6 and instead fixed a ratio of one representative for every
40,000 "inhabitants" with augmentations of representatives to
be determined "upon the principles of their [the states'] wealth
and number of inhabitants. ' 37 This reformulation in terms of
"inhabitants," without specifically including or excluding "In-
diaLs," the Federal Convention adopted." Consequently, the
resolutions of the Virginia Plan, as then amended, did not
mention "Indians" but referred only to "Inhabitants" of the
thirteen states. 39
36. State of the Resolutions Submitted to the Consideration of the House by the
Honorable Mr[.] Randolph, as Altered, Amended, and Agreed to in a Committee of
the Whole House, supra note 29, para. 7.
37. Report of the Committee of Five Members to Whom Was Referred the First
Clause of the First Proposition Reported from the Grand Committee [of the Federal
Convention to Whom Were Referred the Eighth Resolution and Such Part of the
Seventh Resolution As Had Not Already Been Decided On] (July 7 or 8 or 9, 1787),
reprinted in 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 559.
38. The Federal Convention first ratified the principle of reapportionment according
to the wealth and numbers of "inhabitants," set forth as the second paragraph of the
Repot of the Committee of Five Members. 1 RacoRns, supra note 13, at 560 (July 9,
1787) (motion of unnamed delegates). The principle would modify the initial apportion-
ment. The Convention referred the first paragraph of that report, fixing the initial
numbar of representatives for each state as one representative for every 40,000 "inhab-
itants," to another committee, the Committee of One Member from Each State to
Whom Was Referred the First Paragraph of the Report of the Committee of Five
Members. Id. at 560, 562 (July 9, 1787) (motion of Roger Sherman, Connecticut, and
Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania). This committee set the number of representatives
for each state. Report of the Committee of One Member from Each State to Whom
Was Referred the First Paragraph of the Report of the Committee of Five Members
(July 9 or 10, 1787), reprinted in I RECoRDs, supra note 13, at 566 (July 10, 1787). The
Federal Convention approved this reallocation. Id. at 570 (July 10, 1787) (motion of
unnamed delegates). It disapproved a motion to ask the Committee of One Member
from E3ach State upon what principle it decided the new allocation. Id. at 571 (July 10,
1787) (motion of unnamed delegates). The Federal Convention ratified the whole of the
amended seventh resolution on July 16, 1787. 2 id. at 15-16 (July 16, 1787) (motion of
unnamed delegates, referring to "inhabitants").
39. See Proceedings of the [Federal] Convention for the Establishment of a National
Government para. 7, cls. 2, 3 (July 23, 1787) (resolutions referred to Committee of
Detail on July 23, 1787, for reformulation into a constitution), reprinted in 2 Racoans,
supra note 13, at 129, 130-31.
"Inhabitants" did comprehend blacks and slaves, but probably did not include Native
Americans. l id. at 597 (July 12, 1787) ("Inhabitants" as a term of the seventh resolution
meant "white & 3/5 of black inhabitants"); Act of Feb. 8, 1786, ch. VIII, 1786 N.Y.
Laws 9, 10 (in law implementing Resolution of Apr. 18, 1783, 24 J. CONTiNENTAL
CONG. 256, 260 (G. Hunt ed. 1922), "Indians who pay taxes" were neither "Citizens
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/3
No. 1] THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 69
The Federal Convention referred these amended resolutions
to the Committee of Detail on July 23, 1787, to organize and
draft a constitution consistent with them.40 The Committee re-
turned a draft on August 6 which mentioned "Indians" in its
provisions for taxation, in terms similar to the original clause:
The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated
by the whole number of white and other free citizens
and inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, in-
cluding those bound to servitude for a term of years,
and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended
in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying
taxes) .... 41
The draft did not expressly exclude "Indians not paying taxes"
from the formula for apportioning representation but did so
indirectly by reference to and incorporation of the clause defin-
ing the subjects of taxation. After fixing the initial ratio of
representation among the states, 42 article IV, section 4 of the
draft prescribed that "the Legislature shall ... [in enumerated
cases that should vary the initial ratio] regulate the number of
representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to the
provisions herein after made, .... "41 The Federal Convention
struck "according to the provisions herein after made" and
inserted "according to the rule hereafter to be provided for
direct taxation. '" 44 The Framers amended and approved the
and Inhabitants" nor "Slaves"); see infra note 47 & text accompanying notes 45, 47.
"Inhabitants" did not mean "residents." Cf. 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 239 (Aug. 9,
1787) (motion to strike "resident" and insert "inhabitant" during deliberations of
qualifications for election to the Senate). The delegates to the Federal Convention never
decided that Native Americans were to be represented in Congress. See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
40. 2 RacoRDs, supra note 13, at 95 (July 23, 1787) (motion of Elbridge Gerry,
Massachusetts).
41. See Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings
of the Federal Convention, art. VI [VII], § 3 (Aug. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 REcoRDs,
supra note 13, at 182-83. The report misnumbered the seventh article as article "VI."
42. Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings
of the Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. IV, § 3.
43. Id. art. IV, § 4.
44. 2 REcoRns, supra note 13, at 219 (Aug. 6, 1787) (motion of Hugh Williamson,
North Carolina). The Federal Convention had already decided that the rules for taxation
and representation should be the same. Proceedings of the [Federal] Convention for the
Establishment of a National Government, supra note 39, para. 7. Indeed, it was suggested
that this approach-specifying the rule for taxation, and merely making the rule for
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clauses treating taxation (article VI [VII], section 3) and repre-
sentation (article IV, section 4) without deliberation in either
case of the significance of "Indians.
' '4
1
This version of the clause excepted "Indians not paying taxes."
Previous versions, interpreted with a comma after "Indians,"
had excepted all "Indians" from the bases of representation. If
a literal interpretation fixes accurately the delegates' purposes,
then the change has significance.1 The numbers of Native Amer-
icants paying taxes in each state would determine to some extent
the proportions of taxation among the states and their represen-
tation in the Congress, even if those Native Americans were not
actually represented in Congress. As a practical matter, the effect
was negligible. A Native American would not be subject to state
taxation unless she or he had left the tribe permanently and had
joined a community of the state.47 Few Native Americans were
representation the same as the rule for taxation-would obscure and make more ac-
ceptable the inclusion of blacks as a basis for apportioning representation. I REcoRDs,
supra note 13, at 595 (July 12, 1787) (statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania). The
Committee of Detail gave effect to this decision in the constitution it proposed, although
it did not identify "the provisions herein after made." The subsequent amendment by
the Fderal Convention corrected this oversight.
45. 2 RacoRns, supra note 13, at 219-23 (Aug. 8, 1787) (consideration of art. IV,
§ 4, on representation); id. at 350 (Aug. 20, 1787) (consideration of art. VI [VII], § 3,
on taxation); id. at 356-57 (Aug. 21, 1787) (consideration of art. VI [VII], § 3, on
taxation).
46. The evidence does not completely resolve whether a literal interpretation is
appropriate. The first two drafts of the Articles of Confederation excepted "Indians
not paying taxes." Articles of Confederation-First Draft, supra note 27, art. XI, at
548; Articles of Confederation-Second Draft, supra note 27, art. XI, at 677-78 col. 2.
The Articles of Confederation itself included no such provision. See The Articles of
Conf deration art. VIII (U.S. 1781), reprinted in 9 J. CONT14ENTAL CoNo. 907, 913
col. 2 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (Nov. 15, 1777). An amendment to it proposed in 1783
excepted "Indians." Resolution of Apr. 18, 1783, reprinted in 24 J. CONTiNENTAL CONe.
256, 260 (G. Hunt ed. 1922). Mr. Madison's notes and various reports during the
Federal Convention exhibited both versions. See supra notes 26, 29-30 and accompanying
text; svpra text accompanying note 41.
The three-fifths clause is rational either way: Either the number excludes only those
Native Americans not subject to taxation, or it includes three fifths "of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description" who are not paying taxes and are not
Native Americans. A free black paying taxes would thus be counted as one person, not
as three fifths of one person. According to the first two drafts of the Articles of
Confederation, however, only an exclusion of "Indians not paying taxes" is sensible.
47. The members of the Federal Convention never discussed the meaning of "In-
dians not paying taxes." See supra text accompanying notes 32, 45. One gleans this
meaning of the term from contemporaneous interpretations of a like term in the Articles
of Confederation. Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs in the Southern Depart-
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thus subject to taxation.
48
The Federal Convention then formed a Committee of Style
and Arrangement and referred to it the approved articles of the
draft.49 The report of the Committee stated the three-fifths clause
ment (July 31, 1787), reprinted in 33 J. Coln=,MNr.T CONG. 455, 457-59 (R. Hill ed.
1936) (Aug. 3, 1787) [hereinafter Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee
Report]; Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statement of Thomas Jefferson, Virginia), reprinted in 6 J. CoNwmmrrAL CONG.
1077, 1077-78 ff. Ford ed. 1906); Letter of James Madison to James Monroe (Nov.
27, 1784) ("By Indians not members of a State, must be meant those, I conceive who
do not live within the body of the Society, or whose Persons or property form no
objects of its laws."), reprinted in 2 Tan Wrrimrs oF JM rs MADISON 91, 91 (G. Hunt
ed. 1901). Subsequent opinions have reiterated this definition. See Taxation of Indian
Cotton, 12 Op. Att'ys Gen. 208, 214 (1867) ("Even when these Indians [existing under
their regular tribal associations] and their territory are situated within the bounds of a
State of the Union, they are not subject to State taxation."); "Indians Not Taxed"-
Interpretation of Constitutional Provision, 57 Interior Dec. 195, 206 (1940) (Native
Americans are subject to taxation by a state "either by settling or by purchasing property
within its jurisdiction").
48. See F. COHEN, supra note 11, at 388. The first federal census of 1790 did not
indicate the numbers of Native Americans whom the states taxed and who thus had
already become members of colonial society and had relinquished membership in their
own tribe or nation. It employed only the categories that the statute specified. The
statute directed that "Indians not taxed" be excluded, but did not specify how to
include any Native Americans who were taxed. The census basically counted free white
persons, free "others," and slaves. Perhaps the omission of a category for "Indians
taxed" indicates a paucity of such instances and an invisibility of the problem. One
presumes that the category for free "others" would include those Native Americans
paying taxes; it would also include free blacks. Free "others" comprised 1.57 percent
of the total and 1.88 percent of all free persons. See RETURN o" TE WHOLE NtMBR
OF PERSONS wrrnN THB SEvm.AL DisTiCTs Op THB UmTED STATES (1791 & photo.
reprint n.d.); Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 101.
49. See 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 553 (Sept. 8, 1787). As amended, the two
clauses were:
[Art. IV,] Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in the different states
will alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be
divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or
more States may be united; as new States will be erected within the limits
of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate
the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to
the rule hereinafter made for direct taxation not exceeding the rate of one
for every forty thousand.
[Art. VII,] Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated
by the whole number of free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex,
and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years,
and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing
description, (except Indians not paying taxes) ....
Id. at 566, 571 (art. IV, § 4, art. VII, § 3) (editor's compilation of the various
amendments to the Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the
Proceedings of the Federal Convention, supra note 41, which articles the Convention
then referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement).
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as the Constitution states it, "excluding Indians not taxed," ' 0
with the sole exception that the Federal Convention subsequently
substituted "Service" for "Servitude." 51 The Federal Conven-
tion agreed to the Constitution on September 17, 1787.2
Of what import is the three-fifths clause? First, it grants no
power to the United States over Native Americans. Secondly,
throughout its formulation, Native Americans were never dis-
cussed. The term "Indians not paying taxes," adopted from a
previously proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation
to define the "equitable ratio" of representation and taxation
among the states, was incorporated without discussion. It implies
that states had some power to tax individual Native Americans.
Lastly, also by implication, the Framers excluded all Native
American tribes "within" the limits of the states" from the
basis of apportioning representation in the national legislature,
for tribes could not be taxed.5
B. The Indian Commerce Clause
The first recorded consideration of a national legislative power
that might pertain to Native Americans appears in a working
paper of the Committee of Detail, two months after the Federal
Convention convened. On Edmund Randolph's sketch of a con-
stitution, in the margin of its proposed legislative power "To
provide tribunals and punishment for mere offences against the
law of nations," John Rutledge of South Carolina annotated
:50. Compare Report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement art. I, § 2, cl. b
(Sept. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 590, 590, with U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause).
51. 2 REco.Ds, supra note 13, at 607 (Sept. 13, 1787) (motion of Edmund Ran-
dolph, Virginia).
52. Id. at 644-45 (Sept. 17, 1787) (motion of Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania).
53. The use of "within" throughout this essay must be considered with care;
therelore, it is placed in quotation marks. "Within the limits of the state" or "within
the limits of the United States" implies, wrongly, that Native Americans or their lands
were or are within the territorial boundaries, jurisdiction, or political boundaries of the
state or the United States and thus were or are subject to the sovereignty or personal
and territorial jurisdiction of the state or United States. E.g., infra note 63. Statutes
and discussions about sovereignty frequently used the word "within."
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; cf. [Northwest] Ordinance of July 13,
1787, art. 3, reprinted in 32 J. oF aH COn UMNTAL CoNe. 334, 340-41 (R. Hill ed.
1936), ratifled in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a; Treaty with the
Cheroke.- Nation (Treaty of Hopewell), Nov. 28, 1785, United States-Cherokee Nation,
art. 12, 7 Stat. 18, 20 (providing that the Cherokee Nation had a right to send a deputy
to Congress); Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware
Nation, art. 6, 7 Stat. 13, 14 (providing that the Delaware and other nations might
"form a state" and "have a representation [in Congress]").
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"Indian Affairs. ' 55 The "law of nations," as European jurists
had variously fashioned it, did treat Native Americans. 6 How-
ever, the Committee of Detail's report on August 6 did not
include "Indian affairs" in that clause 5 7 nor did it state any
legislative power respecting Native Americans.58 No subsequent
discussion of this clause expressed any intent that it comprehend
Native Americans.
59
On August 18, 1787, while the Convention was debating the
powers of the legislative branch, James Madison proposed ad-
ditional powers, to be submitted first to the Committee of Detail
for its consideration. Among them was a distinct power "To
regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the
limits of the U. States." 6 In place of Mr. Madison's plenary
power, the Committee of Detail proposed to amend the power
"To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states; ' 61 to include "and with Indians, within the Limits
of any State, not subject to the laws thereof." 62
With this change, Congress would have the power to regulate
commerce with Native Americans who were living "within" the
territorial limits of a state but were neither citizens of the state
nor subject to its jurisdiction. 6 Like article IX of the Articles
55. E. Randolph, [Draft] Constitution (July 26, 1787) (his sketch of the principles
underlying and the powers to be granted by the Constitution), reprinted in 2 RncoRus,
supra note 13, at 137, 143 & n.11.
56. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
57. Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings
of the Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. VI [VII], § 1, cl. 12 ("To declare the
law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the
punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences against the
law of nations").
58. See id. arts. II-VIII [XI].
59. See 2 RncoRns, supra note 13, at 315-16 (Aug. 17, 1787) ("to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the securities and current
coin of the U. States, and offences agst. the law of Nations"); id. at 614-15 (Sept. 14,
1787) (motion of Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania).
60. Id. at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of James Madison, Virginia).
61. Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings
of the Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. VI [VII], § 1, cl. 2. This clause the
Convention had approved without amendment on August 16. 2 RaconDs, supra note
13, at 308 (Aug. 16, 1787).
62. Report of the Committee of Detail (Aug. 22, 1787), reprinted in 2 REcoRDs,
supra note 13, at 366, 367.
63. "Limits" and "jurisdiction" were distinct terms. See 2 RacoaDs, supra note
13, at 463 (Aug. 30, 1787) (motion and statement of Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania,
regarding a proposed clause about the admission of new states comprising territory
within the "limits" of existing states, moving to substitute "jurisdiction" for "limits"
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of Confederation, 64 this national power could not interfere with
the legislative rights and the jurisdiction of the states; but its
scope was even more limited than that of article IX, for it
extended only to "commerce," not to all "affairs." 65 It should
be noted that the Articles of Confederation, James Madison's
proposal, and the report of the Committee of Detail all con-
cerned regulation or management of "affairs" or "commerce"
with Native Americans, not of Native Americans. 6 The power
did not reach the domestic or foreign affairs of tribes.
Although the delegates did discuss the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations and among the states, they did not discuss
the Committee of Detail's proposed amendment 67 and referred
it instead to another committee on August 31.6 This committee
reported on September 4 what is now the commerce clause: 69
that the power "To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States;" 70 be amended to include "and
with the Indian tribes." 7 1 This second amendment would limit
the national power further. As amended, the object of the power
and explaining that this substitute, for example, would "guard the case of Vermont,
the jurisdiction of N. York not extending over Vermont which was in the exercise of
sovereignty, tho' Vermont was within the asserted limits of New York"). Thus, Native
Americans could be within the limits of a state but not subject to its jurisdiction.
(4. "The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive
right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians
not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State within
its own limits be not infringed or violated .... ." The Articles of Confederation art.
IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781), reprinted in 9 J. CONTRM .rL CoNo. 907, 919 col. 2 (W. Ford
ed. 1907) (Nov. 15, 1777).
65. Compare Report of the Committee of Detail, supra note 62, with The Articles
of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781). See also infra note 96, which discusses
the Articles of Confederation.
66. Report of the Committee of Detail, supra note 62; 2 Rco ns, supra note 13,
at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of James Madison, Virginia); The Articles of Confed-
eration art. IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781).
67. 2 REcoRDS, supra note 13, at 449-53 (Aug. 29, 1787) (motion of Charles
Pinckney, South Carolina, and Luther Martin, Maryland); see also id. at 211 (Aug. 7,
1787).
68. Id. at 481 (Aug. 31, 1787) (motion of Roger Sherman, Connecticut).
69. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;").
70). Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings
of the Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. VI [VII], § 1, cl. 2.
71. Report of the Committee of Eleven to Whom Such Parts of the Constitution,
As Have Been Postponed, and Such Parts of Reports, As Have Not Been Acted On,
Were Referred para. 2 (Sept. 4, 1787), reprinted in 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 497.
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was "Indian tribes," not individual "Indians."' 2 The power
would reach tribes "within" the limits of states, even though
tribes were not subject to the jurisdiction of states. It would
not reach individual Native Americans-even those who had
relinquished tribal membership and were subject to the jurisdic-
tion of a state.
The Federal Convention approved this proposal without de-
bate. 73 The Committee of Style and Arrangement reviewed the
clause, 4 made some stylistic changes, and reported it exactly as
the Constitution states it.75 The Federal Convention agreed to
the Constitution on September 17, 1787.76
This is all that the Framers said (and recorded) at the Federal
Convention about the relation of Native Americans and the
Constitution.77 Certain conclusions follow. First, the Indian com-
merce clause has been cited for a plenary legislative authority
in Congress over Native Americans 7 8 but the analysis above
72. Compare 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of James
Madison, Virginia) ("Indians"), and Report of the Committee of Detail, supra note 62
("Indians"), with Report of the Committee of Eleven, supra note 71, para. 2 ("Indian
tribes"). Contra United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 417 (1866) ("commerce
with the Indian tribes, means commerce with the individuals composing those tribes").
73. 2 RncoRns, supra note 13, at 499 (Sept. 4, 1787).
74. Id. at 569 (art. VII, § 1, cl. 2) ("To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states; and with the Indian tribes.").
75. Compare Report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement, supra note 50,
art. I, § 8, ci. c, with U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause).
76. 2 REcoss, supra note 13, at 644-45 (Sept. 17, 1787) (motion of Benjamin
Franklin, Pennsylvania).
77. The Articles of Confederation had excepted imminent invasion by an Indian
nation from its general mandate that states secure the consent of Congress before
engaging in war. The Articles of Confederation art. VI, para. 5 (U.S. 1781) ("No State
shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled,
unless such State ... shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed
by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not
to admit of a delay till the United States, in Congress assembled, can be consulted
.... "), reprinted in 9 J. CoNTnqNTAL CONG. 907, 912 col. 2 (WT. Ford ed. 1907)
(Nov. 15, 1777). The Constitution preserved for the states a broader exception, for any
imminent invasion. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cI. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, . . . engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay."). The Framers did not mention Native Americans during
deliberations of this clause, either. See 2 RacoRns, supra note 13, at 442-43 (Aug. 28,
1787); Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings of
the Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. XII [XIII]; Report of the Committee of
Style and Arrangement, supra note 50, art. I, § 10, cl. a; 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13,
at 625-26 (Sept. 15, 1787).
78. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("while
the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade among the
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demonstrates that the clause conferred no such power. Secondly,
the treaty clause,79 the property clause, 0 and the war powers"
have each been cited to confer upon the federal government
constitutional authority over Native Americans, 8 2 but the Fram-
ers never mentioned Native Americans during their recorded
States ... , the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs ... ."); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) ("Congress has broad power to
regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause"). See also McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). But cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79,
383-84 (1886) (federal criminal statute was constitutional, not under Indian commerce
clause, for the code of common-law crimes makes no reference to trade or intercourse,
but because Native Americans are wards of the nation).
Such citations are a little curious, considering the dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden that
"[commerce] must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit,
unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). For example, "commerce with foreign nations" and
"commerce ... among the several states" never imputed to Congress a plenary power
to regulate the affairs of states and foreign nations, as the Indian commerce clause has
been held to authorize with respect to Native Americans. See Cotton Petroleum Corp.,
490 U.S. at 192.
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He [the Executive] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur; .... ).
80. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.").
81. rd. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 ("The Congress shall have Power To
... provide for the common Defence ... of the United States; ... To declare War,
... To raise and support Armies, ... To provide and maintain a Navy; ... To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; ... To provide for organizing, arming, and disci-
plining, the Militia .... ").
82. The Supreme Court has cited for such authority the treaty clause, e.g., Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715
(1943); United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whisky, 93 U.S. 188 passim (1876);
Worceiter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), the property clause, see Oklahoma
v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1911); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 44 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring); cf. United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886), and the war powers, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); see Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.
705, 715 (1943); United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Sante Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
326, 34.7 (1941); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-
91 (1823); see also United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
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debates about the treaty clause,83 the property clause,8 or the
war powers of the Congress.85 Thirdly, Congress has since been
83. See [Draft] The Hamilton Plan arts. IV, VI (1787) (statement of Alexander
Hamilton, New York, on his general scheme for a government, including inter alia a
treaty power but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 1 RacoRDs, supra note
13, at 282, 292 (June 18, 1787); The Pinckney Plan paras. 9, 15 (1787) (including a
treaty power but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 2 REcoRas, supra note
13, at 134, 135-36; E. Randolph, supra note 55 (including a treaty power but not
mentioning Native Americans, although John Rutledge subsequently emended "Indian
Affairs" beside a different clause establishing power in the legislature to address offences
against the law of nations), reprinted in 2 REcoRns, supra note 13, at 137, 143, 145;
Report of the Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings of the
Federal Convention, supra note 41, art. VIII [IX], § 1 (including a treaty power but
not mentioning Native Americans); 2 RncoRns, supra note 13, at 297-98 (June 18, 1787)
(debating the treaty power but not mentioning Native Americans); id. at 392-94 (Aug. 23,
1787) (same); Report of the Committee of Eleven to Whom Such Parts of the Consti-
tution, As Have Been Postponed, and Such Parts of Reports, As Have Not Been Acted
On, Were Referred, supra note 71, para. 7 (including a treaty power but not mentioning
Native Americans); 2 RncoRns, supra note 13, at 538, 540-41, 543 (Sept. 7, 1787)
(debating the treaty power but not mentioning Native Americans); id. at 547-50 (Sept. 8,
1787) (same); Report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement, supra note 50, art.
II, § 2(a) (including a treaty power but not mentioning Native Americans).
84. See 2 RcoRns, supra note 13, at 324 (Aug. 18,. 1787) (motion of James
Madison, Virginia, proposing an additional legislative power, "To dispose of the un-
appropriated lands of the U. States," to be referred to the Committee of Detail, but
not mentioning Native Americans); id. at 461-66 (Aug. 30, 1787) (not mentioning Native
Americans); id. at 578 (art. XVII, para. 2, not mentioning Native Americans); Report
of the Committee of Style and Arrangement, supra note 50, art. IV, § 3, para. 2 (not
mentioning Native Americans); cf. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Liv-
ingston (Nov. 25, 1803) (discussing his remembrance concerning the power of the United
States over its territory, but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 3 REcoRDs,
supra note 13, at 401; Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4,
1803) (discussing his remembrance concerning the power of the United States over its
territory, but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 3 REcoRis, supra note
13, at 404.
85. See I REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 18-19 (May 29, 1787) (statement of Edmund
Randolph, Virginia, discussing the war powers before introducing a resolution relevant
to them in the Virginia Plan, but not mentioning Native Americans); id. at 24-26
(May 29, 1787) (statement of Edmund Randolph) (same); The Virginia Plan, supra note
23, para. 6 (not mentioning Native Americans); I RacoRns, supra note 13, at 54
(May 31, 1787) (statement of James Madison, Virginia) (same); id. at 65-66 (June 1,
1787) (statements of John Rutledge, South Carolina, and James Wilson, Pennsylvania)
(same); id. at 144 (June 6, 1787) (statement of George Mason, Virginia) (same); The
New Jersey Plan, supra note 30, paras. 4, 6 (same); I REcoRns, supra note 13, at 292
(June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander Hamilton, New York, on his general scheme
for a government, including inter alia war powers but not mentioning Native Americans);
E. Randolph, supra note 55 (sketching the principles of and powers to be granted by
the Constitution, including war powers, but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted
in 2 REcoRns, supra note 13, at 143-44; J. Wilson, [Draft] Constitution arts. 8, 10
(1787) (same), reprinted in 2 Rncomas, supra note 13, at 163, 167-69; Report of the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
78 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
embellished with a status and power of guardianship of Native
American tribes, 86 but the Constitution does not establish and
the Framers never discussed such a status and plenary power.
87
C. The Original Understanding,
According to the Text and Debates
Analysis of the Constitution's text and the Framers' deliber-
ations reveals that the original understanding of the national
power with respect to Native Americans comprehended only two
principles. First, the few Native Americans within the jurisdic-
tion. (not limits) of a state and taxed by that state would augment
thai: state's proportions of taxation and representation. However,
the three-fifths clause did not require members of Congress to
represent these Native Americans or their interests; the formula
Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings of the Federal Convention,
supra note 41, art. VI [VII], § 1, cls. 14-17, art. XII [XIII] (not mentioning Native
Americans); 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 318-19 (Aug. 17, 1787) (same); id. at 326,
329-33 (Aug. 18, 1787) (same); id. at 341 (Aug. 20, 1787) (motion of Charles Pinckney,
South Carolina) (same); Report of the Committee of Eleven to Whom Were Referred
the Propositions Respecting the Debts of the Several States and the Militia cl. 2 (Aug. 21,
1787) (same), reprinted in 2 REcoRns, supra note 13, at 356 (Aug. 21, 1787); id. at
384-88, 389-90 (Aug. 23, 1787) (same); id. at 443 (Aug. 28, 1787) (art. XIII adopted as
amended without mention of Native Americans); id. at 563 (Sept. 10, 1787) (statement
of Edmund Randolph, Virginia) (not mentioning Native Americans); Report of the
Committee of Style and Arrangement, supra note 50, art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-n, p-q (same);
2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 617-18 (Sept. 14, 1787) (motion of George Mason, Virginia,
and Edmund Randolph, Virginia) (same); id. at 633 (Sept. 15, 1787) (statement of
Elbridge Gerry, Massachusetts) (same); cf. Martin, The Genuine Information, delivered
to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, relative to the Proceedings of the General
Convention, held in Philadelphia, in 1787 (serial publication of a speech by Luther
Martin, delegate of Maryland to the Federal Convention, delivered on Nov. 29, 1787,
printed in Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser, Dec. 28, 1787 through Feb. 8,
1788) (outlining issues before the Federal Convention concerning war powers, but not
mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 3 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 172, 207-09.
86. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (plenary power of Congress to
legislate about Native Americans is "based on a history of treaties and the assumption
of a 'guardian-ward' status"); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10
(1935); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439-41, 443 (1926); United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-47 (1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-84
(18861; cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (although not imputing
to Congress derivative legislative power, holding that Native American nations are not
"foreign" states, but "domestic dependent nations," whose "relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian").
87. See U.S. CoNsT. (not declaring that any powers of guardianship exist in the
United States or that Native Americans have the status of wards of the United States);
see supra text accompanying notes 32, 59, 77, 83-85 & infra text accompanying note
125 (Framers never discussed Native Americans at all).
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only determined the ratio of representation and taxation among
the states. Native Americans, like blacks, were not actually
represented."
Secondly, the national legislative power is limited to commerce
with Native American tribes, and extends no farther. The Fram-
ers restricted Mr. Madison's proposal of a separate and broad
legislative power "To regulate affairs with the Indians as well
within as without the limits of the U. States" to a partial and
narrower power "To regulate Commerce with ... the Indian
Tribes."
89
One can estimate why and how Mr. Madison's comprehen-
sive-indeed plenary-power became a limited power. In 1781,
the states had transferred to the Continental Congress the "sole
and exclusive right and power" to treat with Native Americans.9
But between 1781 and 1787, in spite of article IX, states had
regulated and confiscated Native American lands, had warred
with Native American tribes, and had engaged in commerce with
Native American tribes.91
88. 2 REcORDs, supra note 13, at 223 (Aug. 8, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman,
Connecticut) ("Mr. Sherman. did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the
ratio of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of
the Southn. States who were in fact to be represented according to the taxes paid by
them, and the Negroes are only included in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea
of the matter."). Compare MAss. BAY CoNsr. art. V (1778) (proposed constitution
which towns of Massachusetts Bay disapproved had provided in part that "EVERY
male inhabitant of any town in this State, being free and twenty one years of age,
excepting negroes, Indians and mulattoes, shall be entitled to vote . .. ."), reprinted in
THE PopuLAR SouRcEs OF PoicAL AuHoRrry: DocuMNrs ON THE MAssAcHUSETrs
CONsTrrunoN op 1780, at 190, 192 (0. Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966) [hereinafter
POPuLAR SouRCEs], with Return of Town of Charlemont (May 12, 1778) (objecting to
exclusion of negroes, Indians, and mulattoes), reprinted in PopuLAR SouxcEs, supra, at
217, 217, and Return of Town of Sutton (May 18, 1778) ("And it must be thought
more insulting tho not so cruel [as exclusion of blacks], to deprive the original Natives
of the Land the Privileges of Men."), reprinted in PoPUIAR SouRcEs, supra, at 230,
231, and Return of Town of Boothbay (May 20, 1778) ("[Mluch less can we consent
thus injuriously to tseat the original Lords and proprietors of the land."), reprinted in
PoPuLAR SouacEs, Supra, at 245, 248-49, and Return of Town of Georgetown (May 25,
1778) (disapproving that "a Man being born in Africa, India or ancient America or
even being much Sun burnt deprived him of having a Vote for Representative"),
reprinted in PoputA SouRcEs, supra, at 277, 277.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 60-73.
90. The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781).
91. See Act of Mar. 1, 1788, ch. 47, 1788 N.Y. Laws 100 (authorizing treaties
between New York and Native Americans); Treaty with the Oneida Nation (Treaty of
Fort Schuyler), Sept. 22, 1788, New York-Oneida Nation, cited in Oneida Indian Nation
of New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1148 (2d Cir. 1988); Treaty with the Creek
Nation (Treaty of Shoulder-Bone), Nov. 3, 1786, Georgia-Creek Nation, reprinted in 2
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
80 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 16
Mr. Madison mentioned such encroachments upon federal
power during the Convention.Y This statement was the only
recorded expression during the Convention of any problem in-
vohring Native Americans which the Constitution should meet.
It concerned the fundamental problem of the relation between
national sovereignty and state sovereignty and encroachment
upon federal authority. In The Federalist, Mr. Madison again
criticized the effectively "compleat sovereignty in the States"
under article IX.9
To address this problem, Mr. Madison proposed a power for
the national government roughly as broad as the federal power
under the Articles of Confederation-a power which the states
had not respected. Where the Articles of Confederation had also
expressly preserved "the legislative right of any State within its
own limits,"94 however, the power proposed by Mr. Madison
had extended to "within ... the limits of the U. States," n.b.
within the limits of each state.95 What could well have occurred
behind closed doors was another compromise: States, having
arrogated to themselves and exercised the powers concerning
Native American affairs that they had originally granted to the
DocumirmRY HSToRY OF THE FhT FEvmuL CoNORESS oF Tm UNITED STATES OF
AmEICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARcH 3, 1791: SENATE ExEcUTWE JouRNAL AND RELATED
DocuMents 180 (L. DePauw ed. 1974) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TInE FmsT
FEDMi CONGRESS]; Treaty with the Creek Nation (Treaty of Galphinton), Nov. 12,
1785, Georgia-Creek Nation, reprinted in 2-1 AImt cAN STATE PAPms: INDIAN AFFAmS
17 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds. 1832); Treaty with the Oneida Nation (Treaty of Fort
Herkimer), June 23, 1785, New York-Oneida Nation, cited in Oneida Indian Nation of
New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1148 (2d Cir. 1988); Treaty with the Creek
Nation (Treaty of Augusta), Nov. 1, 1783, Georgia-Creek Nation, reprinted in 2 Doc-
um rARY HISTORY OF FIRST FEDE RL CoNoREss, supra, at 165. See also Southern
Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note 47, at 455-62 (North
Carolina, Georgia); H. M , TAE TREATY OF FORT STANwIx 1784, at 23-32 (1932);
F. PaucHA, AmmucAN IND N PoLicy IN Ta FORmATrv YEAns: THE INDLAN TRADE
AND IWrMcOURSE AcTs 1790-1834, at 31-40 (1962); Graymont, New York State Indian
Policy after the Revolution, 57 N.Y. HIST. 438, 444-60 (1976).
92. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 316 (June 19, 1787) (statement of James Madison,
Virginia).
93. See TEE FEDmns-r No. 42, at 279, 284-85 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
See also Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note 47,
at 457 (Georgia's and North Carolina's construction of The Articles of Confederation
art. E(, para. 4, "leave the federal powers [of regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Native Americans], in this case, a mere nullity").
94. The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781), reprinted In 9 J.
ConrrnNEmiNT CoNo. 907, 919 col. 2 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (Nov. 15, 1777).
95. 2 REcop:Ds, supra note 13, at 325 (Aug. 18, 1787) (motion of James Madison,
Virginia).
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federal government, decided to yield to the national government
only power over commerce with the Native American tribes.9
The states had undertaken a similar retraction of federal power
during formulation of the Articles of Confederation. 97 In that
instance, some members of the Continental Congress did express
their motives. While discussing the first draft of the Articles of
Confederation, they expressed the gamut of views about its "sole
and exclusive Right and Power of ... Regulating the Trade,
and managing all Affairs with the Indians."98 Some argued that
the colonies should not vest in Congress the power to manage
every affair concerning Native Americans, including trade be-
cause the trade was profitable to the individual colonies. 99 Others
96. For another view, see 1 F. PRUcHA, supra note 12, at 50 ("The lack of debate
[during the Convention] on the question [of Native Americans] indicates, perhaps, the
universal agreement that Indian affairs should be left in the hands of the federal
government.").
97. Under the initial draft proposed by John Dickinson of Delaware, "The United
States assembled shall have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of ... Regulating
the Trade, and managing all Affairs with the Indians ..... Articles of Confederation-
First Draft, supra note 27, art. XVIII, at 550. Specifically with respect to territory,
no Purchases of Lands, hereafter to be made of the Indians by Colonies
or private Persons before the Limits of the Colonies are ascertained, to
be valid: All purchases of Lands not included within those Limits, where
ascertained, to be made-by Contracts between the United States assembled
... and the great Councils of the Indians, for the general benefit of all
the United Colonies.
Id. art. XIV, at 549. The states restricted the federal powers to Native Americans "not
members of any of the States" and struck entirely the proposed prohibition upon the
states' right of pre-emption. Articles of Confederation-Second Draft, supra note 27,
art. XIV, at 681 n.l, 682 col. 2. Compare Letter of James Madison to James Monroe,
supra note 47.
The states disapproved two subsequently proposed amendments, and adopted a third
forming the final article. The first proposal would have further restricted the federal
power, replacing "not members of any of the states," with "not residing within the
limits of any of the United States.]" 9 J. CoN'n mNrA CoNe. 844 (W. Ford ed. 1907)
(Oct. 27, 1777). The second would have augmented the federal power, to one of
"managing all affairs relative to war and peace with all Indians not members of any
particular State, and regulating the trade with such nations and tribes as are not resident
within such limits wherein a particular State claims, and actually exercises jurisdiction[.]"
Id. Instead of these two proposals, the states appended to "the sole and exclusive power
of ... regulating the trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the states," the proviso, "provided, that the legislative right of any State, within
its own limits be not infringed or violated." Id. at 845 (Oct. 28, 1777). It was this
proviso which created the "compleat sovereignty in the States" that Mr. Madison
criticized.
98. Articles of Confederation-First Draft, supra note 27, art. XVIII, at 550.
99. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statements of Edward Rutledge, South Carolina; Thomas Lynch, Jr., South
Carolina; and Thomas Stone, Maryland), reirinted in 6 J. CoNTn&NTAL CoNG. 1077,
1077, 1079 (V. Ford ed. 1906).
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replied that only the Continental Congress, not the individual
colonies, should have this power in order to preclude conflicts
between colonies with different commercial interests respecting
Nalive Americans and to prevent conflicts between individual
colonies and Native American tribes. 1w Thomas Jefferson noted
that the power would reach only Native Americans subject to
the laws of a colony, not those outside a colony's jurisdiction. 10
The delegates to the Federal Convention in 1787 who ultimately
limited the national power might have shared and iterated these
contrary views.
The original understanding-that no plenary power exists in
the national government-implies that many acts of the United
States respecting Native Americans were and are ultra vires.
These acts cannot become "constitutional" even though Con-
gress enacted them, the President signed them, and the Supreme
Court upheld them.lea Nor could the United States confer upon
100. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776 (statements of Button Gwinnett, Georgia; George Walton, Georgia; James Wilson,
Pennsylvania; and Roger Sherman, Connecticut), reprinted in 6 J. CONTnNTAL CoNe.
1077, 1077-79 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
101. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statement of Thomas Jefferson, Virginia), reprinted in 6 J. CONTMIENTAL CONe.
1077, 1077-78 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
102. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 205, ch. 516, § 2(a), 61 Stat. 920, 921 (Aug. 8, 1947)
(authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to contract for sale of timber in National Forest
"notwithstanding any claim of possessory rights" that were based upon aboriginal
occupancy or title but not confirmed by patent or judicial decision or included in a
reservation), held constitutional in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,
279, 284-85, 288-91 (1955) (by right of conquest, Congress may extinguish Native
American title in its own discretion without compensation pursuant to U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V); Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 6, 31 Stat. 672, 676 (ratifying Treaty with
the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache Tribes (Treaty of Fort Sill), Oct. 6, 1892, United
State-Comanche Tribe-Keowa Tribe-Apache Tribe, art. 1, 31 Stat. 676, 676, which
ceded to the United States 480,000 acres of land, notwithstanding that treaty was not
signed in accordance with prior Treaty with the Kiowa and Apache Tribes, Oct. 21,
1867, United States-Keowa Tribe-Apache Tribe, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585, pursuant to
which no treaty for cession of any portion of the reservation would be valid unless
signed by three fourths of all adult, male members of the tribe), held constitutional in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (act did not violate U.S. CoNsT. amend.
V because the prior treaty of 1867 could not limit the power of Congress over Native
Americans as wards of the United States and its power to abrogate treaties); Act of
June 28, 1898, ch. 517, §§ 11, 21, 28, 30 Stat. 495, 497, 502, 504 (providing that the
federal government may determine which Native Americans are citizens of tribes and
may allot Native American lands only to those determined to be citizens of the tribes,
and abolishing tribal courts), held constitutional in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174
U.S. 445, 488-92 (1899), approved, Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-
08 (1902) (Congress has "power to provide a method for determining membership of
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states powers over Native Americans or Native American lands
which the United States did not have itself, 10 3 such as
five civilized nations, and for ascertaining the citizenship thereof preliminary to a division
of the property of the tribe among its members" and "authority to adopt measures to
make the tribal property productive, and secure therefrom an income for the benefit of
the tribe"); Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, §§ 1, 5, 6, 24 Stat. 388, 388, 389, 390
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331, 348, 349) (conferring upon the President a
discretion to divide Native American lands held in common and allot parcels to individual
Native Americans; requiring issuance of patents for any allotments, the United States
to hold them in trust for 25 years or any greater period; authorizing the United States
to purchase for the benefit of white settlers only any Native American lands not allotted,
the purchase money to be held in trust for Native Americans; subjecting to the civil
and criminal laws of the state or territory in which they live Native Americans who
(must) receive allotments and those who reside separately from any Native American
tribe and have "adopted the habits of civilized life"; and conferring citizenship of the
United States upon the same), held constitutional in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174
U.S. 445, 484-91 (1899) (by implication), and in United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432,
437-39 (1903) (by implication), and in United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1916)
(by implication); Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153) (making it a crime for one Native American to commit
murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, or larceny upon
another Native American upon Native American land, and subjecting that Native
American to federal law and sanction), held constitutional in United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 378-79, 383-84 (1886) (act is constitutional, not under Indian commerce
clause, for the code of common-law crimes makes no reference to trade or intercourse,
but because Native Americans are wards of United States), approved, United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977); Internal Revenue Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186,
§ 107, 15 Stat. 125, 167 (imposing federal taxes on certain articles produced on Native
American lands), held constitutional in The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616,
620 (1871); see also Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985) (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(13)(A), 6903(15), 6928(a)(1), applies to Native American tribes,
and the Environmental Protection Agency has authority to implement a hazardous waste
management program on Native American lands).
103. For example, Public Law 280 conferred upon five named states, and any other
state that so determined, civil and criminal jurisdiction over causes of action and offenses
by or against Native Americans on Native American lands, and provided that the state's
civil and criminal laws shall have the same force and effect within Native Americans'
lands and society. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 7, 67 Stat. 588, 588, 589,
590 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 & note); e.g., Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)
(upholding state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans and Native
American lands, assumed without their consent under Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505,
§§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588, 589 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360), in
areas of compulsory school attendance, public assistance, domestic relations, mental
illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings, dependent children, and operation
of motor vehicles on public roads).
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tawation, 104 civil jurisdiction, 05 criminal jurisdiction, 1  6 jurisdic-
tion over hunting and fishing rights, 107 and jurisdiction over
water rights. 08
The constitutional and legal consequence" of this original un-
deirstanding is a tension between what the national government
may do under the Constitution and what the states may do
104. E.g., Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398)
(states may tax in all respects the production of oil and gas and other minerals on
Native American lands), construed in British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936), and in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 759, 766-68 (1985) (Congress can authorize imposition of state taxes on Native
American tribes and individual Native Americans); Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6,
24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended by Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182,
at 25 U.S.C. § 349), construed in Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1906) (under
§ 6 of the General Allotment Act of 1887, states may tax allotted lands of Native
Americans within Native American reservation), and in Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1956) (under Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, states may tax allotted
lands of Native Americans within Native American reservations after patent in fee is
issued), and in Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of
Yaldma, 903 F.2d 1207, 1211-16 (9th Cir. 1990) (under 25 U.S.C. § 349, states may
impose and levy ad valorem and excise sales taxes upon lands owned by Native
Americans, patented in fee simple, and located within Native American reservations),
petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3180 (U.S. Sept. 5, 1990) (No. 90-408).
105. E.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 4, 7, 67 Stat. 588, 589, 590 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 & note) (conferring upon five named states, and any other state
that so determined, civil jurisdiction over actions by or against Native Americans on
Native American lands, and providing that the state's civil laws shall have the same
force and effect within Native Americans' lands and society); Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch.
119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349) (conveyance to
Native Americans of allotted land by patent in fee simple subjects Native Americans to
the civil and criminal laws of the state or territory "within" which the Native American
land is located).
106. E.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 2, 7, 67 Stat. 588, 588, 590 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) (conferring upon five named states, and any other state that so
determined, criminal jurisdiction over offenses by or against Native Americans on Native
American lands, and providing that the state's criminal laws shall have the same force
and effect within Native Americans' lands and society); Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809,
62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232) (conferring upon the state of New York
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Native Americans on all
reservations within the state, except for jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by Native
Americans pursuant to agreement, treaty, or custom); Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 434, §
7, 22 Stat. 341, 342 (conferring upon Nebraska criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Native Americans and subjecting Native Americans to the civil and criminal laws of
Nebraska).
107. E.g., Act of Jan. 5, 1927, ch. 22, 44 Stat. 932 (authorizing New York to
regulate hunting and fishing on three reservations).
108. E.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545 (1983)
(Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 651, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666)
conferred upon courts of Montana and Arizona, and state courts generally, jurisdiction
to adjudicate Native Americans' water rights).
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pursuant to the tenth amendment. 1°9 In theory, the powers of
states might increase, being no longer pre-empted by federal
laws.
The tenth amendment, of course, does not vest new powers in
the states; the reservoir of authority in the states cannot exceed
its original bounds. Under the tenth amendment, Native American
tribes and nations would continue not to be subject to the juris-
diction of states or the states in Congress assembled.110 Yet states
have exercised power over Native Americans and Native American
lands, without authority, in taxes,"' civil jurisdiction," 2 criminal
109. U.S. CONST. amend X. The amendment states that "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
110. See supra notes 47, 54, 63 and accompanying text.
Ill. E.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 610 (1943)
(Oklahoma could impose inheritance tax upon cash and securities, lands not exempt
from direct taxation by Acts of Congress, and miscellaneous personal property and
insurance belonging to member of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, but could
not tax lands specifically exempt from direct taxation by Acts of Congress); United
States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (County of Roberts, South Dakota, could not
tax or assess lands of Native Americans held by allotment, permanent improvements
such as houses, or personal property); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 14 Ariz.
App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971), rev'd, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona has no jurisdiction to impose tax on income of Navajo Indians
residing on Navajo Reservation and whose income is derived wholly from sources on
the reservation); Blue-Jacket v. Comm'rs of Johnson County, 3 Kan. 294 (1865), revd,
Blue Jacket v. Board of Comm'rs [The Kansas Indians], 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867)
(Kansas could not tax Native American lands); Bryan v. Itasca County, 303 Minn. 395,
228 N.W.2d 249 (1975) (state may impose personal property tax upon property owned
by Native American on Native American land), rev'd, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (§ 4 of
Public Law 280 does not grant states power to tax Native Americans of reservation).
112. E.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 444 (1926) (state court had
jurisdiction to enter decree against Native Americans in action concerning title to Native
American land); Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958) (Arizona's courts
could exercise jurisdiction over civil suits by non-Native Americans against Native
Americans although the action arises on a reservation, unless an act of Congress expressly
prohibits such jurisdiction), rev'd, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Montana ex rel. Firecrow v.
District Court, 167 Mont. 139, 536 P.2d 190 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (state court has no jurisdiction, and Tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction, over an adoption proceeding in which all parties are members of the tribe
and residents of the reservation); Montana ex rel. Kennerly v. District Court, 154 Mont.
488, 466 P.2d 85 (1970), vacated, Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (state
court lacked jurisdiction over action on debt against Native Americans for transactions
occurring on reservation); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Eng'g, P.C., 321 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1982) (court has no jurisdiction over civil
actions arising within Native American lands unless the Native Americans of the
reservation vote to accept state jurisdiction), vacated, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (under federal
law, state courts could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over claims for negligence
and breach of contract for performance wholly on Native American reservation).
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jurisdiction," 3 zoning' 1 4 hunting and fishing rights," 5 water
rights," 6 religion," 7 and general police powers." 8 The states have
113. E.g., Robinson v. Sigler, 187 Neb. 144, 145-46, 148, 187 N.W.2d 756, 758,
759 (holding that Public Law 280, § 2, conferred upon state jurisdiction over homicide
by Native American on reservation, and stating in dictum that the inherent police powers
of the state apply both to Native Americans and Native American lands unless pre-
empted by federal law), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Anderson v. Britton,
212 Or. 1, 20, 23, 318 P.2d 291, 300, 301-02 (1957) (same), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962
(19;8).
114. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109
S. C t. 2994 (1989) (plurality opinion) (county had zoning power over Native American
land owned by non-member), rev'g in part & aff'g in part Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
115. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (New
Mexico could not restrict Tribe's regulation of hunting and fishing by the Tribe on its
own reservation and could not regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on Native
American land); Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961)
(state law prohibiting operation of fish traps applied to Native Americans fishing in
Native Americans' waters), vacated, 369 U.S. 45 (1962) (Alaska could not forbid the
use of salmon traps in Native Americans' waters); Department of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 664, 668-69, 548 P.2d 1058, 1063-64 (1976) (state could regulate
fishing by Native Americans both on and off reservation), vacated on other grounds,
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game [Puyallup I1], 433 U.S. 165, 175-77 (1977)
(state could regulate fishing by Native Americans on Native American lands).
116. E.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (courts of
Montana and Arizona, and state courts generally, had jurisdiction to adjudicate Native
Americans' water rights under Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 651, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666)); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (rejecting
Ari;zona's arguments to gain water rights at the expense of those reserved to Native
Americans); United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 273-75, 697 P.2d 658, 666
(1985) (state court could adjudicate Native American water rights); Montana ex rel.
Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. 76, 82-89, 712 P.2d 754,
758-62 (1985) (same); see also United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690, 702-03 (1899).
117. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
(if state statute is neutral on its face, without reference to religious use, free exercise
clause permits a state to prohibit by criminal law the sacramental use of peyote by
Native American practicing Native American religion), rev'g 307 Ore. 68, 763 P.2d 146
(19:8) (state statute prohibited the sacramental use of peyote by Native American
practicing Native American religion, but such violated the free exercise clause).
118. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463 (1979) (upholding state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans
and Native American lands, without their consent, in areas of compulsory school
attendance, public assistance, domestic relations, mental illness, juvenile delinquency,
adoption proceedings, dependent children, and operation of motor vehicles on public
roads); see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-16
(19F7) (dictum) (state and local laws can apply to Native Americans on Native American
lands if state's interests suffice to justify the assertion of state authority, even if otherwise
pre-empted because- inconsistent with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal
law).; Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718 (1983) (dictum) (state laws can apply to Native
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been even less inclined than has the national government to
introduce humanity into their interactions with Native Ameri-
cans,119 and have themselves undertaken to dominate Native
American tribes., By voiding national authority, this original
understanding might therefore implicate even more serious prac-
tical consequences for Native Americans.
III. Unstated Understandings
Inquiry into the original understanding about Native Ameri-
cans should examine not only the Constitution's text and the
debates, but also whether the Constitution's structure necessarily
implies and the Framers necessarily intended any powers without
declaring them.1 21 The question introduces issues which compli-
cate the original understanding-it might even yield conclusions
contrary to those of Part II-because the debates instance a
remarkable omission. Although the states and individuals cov-
eted Native American lands "within" the United States and the
Western Territory, neither the Framers nor the Constitution (of
a government primarily "instituted for the protection of
property"' 22) discussed the status of Native American
American lands, unless such application would interfere with tribal self-government or
would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (dictum) (same); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (dictum) ("the trend has been away from the idea
of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption").
119. E.g., F. COHEN, supra note 11, at 646-53 (discussing instances when states tried
to deny rights or benefits to Native Americans).
120. E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee
Report, supra note 47, at 455-62 (North Carolina, Georgia); V. DELoRIA, JR. & C.
LYTLn, A. ancAN INDrNs, AmERiCAN JusTicE 203-09 (2d printing 1984); H. MANLEY,
supra note 91, at 23-32; F. PRucHA, supra note 91, at 31-40; Letter from Warriors,
Chiefs, and Representatives of the Cherokee Nation to President Washington and the
Senate of the United States (May 19, 1789) ("We rejoice much to hear that the Great
Congress have got new powers And have become Strong. we now Hope that whatever
is done hereafter by the Great Council will no more be destroyed and made small by
any State:"), reprinted in 2 DocUmENTARY HisTORY OF THE FrsT FmERAL CONOGRss,
supra note 91, at 185, 186; see supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
121. See Brest, supra note 16.
122. 1 RzcoRws, supra note 13, at 594 (July 12, 1787) (statement of Charles Cotes-
worth Pinckney, South Carolina); see also id. at 533 (July 5, 1787) (statement of
Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania).
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"property"'1 and "sovereignty." 124
Native American tribes occupied lands "within" the political
boundaries asserted by states and "within" the Western Terri-
tory (the lands between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mis-
sissippi River). The Framers did consider the Western Territory
and the possibility of new states there; in fact, they debated
competing claims to the territory by various states and the United
States. Yet no delegate expounded upon or even acknowledged
the fact that Native Americans were already occupying these
lands claimed by states and the United States.'2
123. "Property" is enclosed in quotation marks in order to distinguish Native
American conceptions of their relationship with the land and with the things they made
from Anglo-American conceptions of property and from conceptions of property in the
law of nations. Anglo-Americans probably did not and do not have words to describe
that relationship. For a discussion of Native American conceptions, see infra note 142.
See generally W. CRONON, CHANGEs IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY
oF NEw ENGLAND 58-67 (1983); I. SuTrON, INDIAN LAND TEmuan: BmuooaAPmc ESSAYS
AND A GUrmE TO THE LrrERTrguE (1975); Fletcher, Land Tenure, in I HANDBooK OF
AmmucAN INDIANs NORTH OF MEXCO 756 (F. Hodge ed. 1959).
1:24. As Native Americans had no Anglo-American conception of property, so they
had no like conception of sovereignty. See infra note 142. The United States, however,
attributed sovereignty to them in order to validate, within the Western legal tradition,
their grants and cessions of land by treaty to the United States. D. GETCIMS & C.
WitaNsON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDAN LAW 37, 269 (2d ed. 1986).
Concluding, as this article does, that the United States was not sovereign over Native
Americans, does not imply that Native Americans were sovereign in the sense that the
Western legal tradition defines the term.
125. See The Virginia Plan, supra note 23, paras. 10, 11 ("Resolvd. that provision
ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the
United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or other-
wise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the
whole.... Resd. that a Republican Government & the territory of each State, except
in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought to be guaranteed
by the United States to each State") (not mentioning Native Americans); 1 RECORDS,
supra note 13, at 121 (June 5, 1787) (same); id. at 202 (June 11, 1787) (same); id. at
206 (June 11, 1787) (same); State of the Resolutions Submitted to the Consideration of
the House by the Honorable Mr[.] Randolph, as Altered, Amended, and Agreed to in
a Committee of the Whole House, supra note 29, para. 14 (same); [Draft] The New
Jersey Plan para. 7, cl. 3 (1787) ("Whereas it is necessary ... that the States should
be consolidated, by which means all the Citizens thereof will become equally intitied to
and will equally participate in the same Privileges and Rights, and in all waste,
uncultivated, and back Territory and Lands; it is therefore resolved, that all the Lands
contained within the Limits of each State individually, and of the U. S. generally be
considered as constituting one Body or Mass, and be divided into thirteen or more
integral Parts.") (same), reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 13, at 612, 613; The New
Jersey Plan, supra note 30, para. 7 (same); 1 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 405 (June 25,
1787) (statement of George Read, Delaware) (same); id. at 412 (June 25, 1787) (statement
of George Read, Delaware) (same); id. at 441 (June 27, 1787) (statement of Luther
Martin, Maryland, that "The smaller states yielded rights, not the large states-They
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To determine whether the Framers intended and the Consti-
tution implied any powers of national or state sovereignty over
Native American lands without so stating-whether the original
understanding included any unstated understandings-, this part
reviews contemporaneous treatises on sovereignty, proceedings
of the Continental Congress, treaties with Native American
tribes, and The Federalist.
A. Contemporary Jurisprudence
about Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
Perhaps the Framers believed in common and had no cause
to articulate European jurists' conceit that Native American
tribes did not own their lands. The argument took various forms.
Perhaps the Framers believed that Native Americans were un-
civilized and even barbarous, which condition precluded their
gave up their claim to the unappropriated lands . . . .") (same); id. at 463 (June 29,
1787) (statement of George Read, Delaware, that "The ungranted lands also which have
been assumed by particular States must also be given up.") (same); id. at 533-34 (July 5,
1787) (statement of Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania) (same); id. at 541 (July 6, 1787)
(statement of Rufus King, Massachusetts) (same); 2 id. at 2-3 (July 14, 1787) (motion
of Elbridge Gerry, Massachusetts, and Rufus King, Massachusetts) (same); id. at 46
(July 18, 1787) (same); Proceedings of the [Federal] Convention for the Establishment
of a National Government, supra note 39, para. 8, cl. 9 (same); E. Randolph, supra
note 55 (same), reprinted in 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 147-48; Report of the
Committee of Detail to Whom Were Referred the Proceedings of the Federal Convention,
supra note 41, art. VIII [XI], §§ 2, 3, art. XVI [XVII] (same); 2 REcoRDs, supra note
13, at 442 (Aug. 28, 1787) (same); id. at 454-56 (Aug. 29, 1787) (same); id. at 461-66
(Aug. 30, 1787) (same); id. at 470 (Aug. 30, 1787) (same); id. at 543 (Sept. 7, 1787)
(motion of Hugh Williamson, North Carolina, and Richard Dobbs Spaight, North
Carolina, "that no Treaty of Peace affecting Territorial rights shd be made without the
concurrence of two thirds of the members of the Senate present.") (same); id. at 565,
578 (art. XVII, para. 1) (same); Report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement,
supra note 50, art. IV, § 3, cl. I (same); 2 RPcoRws, supra note 13, at 628 (Sept. 15,
1787) (same); cf. Martin, supra note 85 (outlining issues before the Federal Convention
concerning the Western lands, but not mentioning Native Americans), reprinted in 3
REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 223-27; Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston (Nov. 25, 1803), supra note 84 (reporting that during the Federal Convention,
he "knew as well then, as I do now, that all North America must at length be annexed
to us," but never mentioning Native Americans); Letter from Gouverneur Morris to
Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), supra note 84 (reporting his opinion that the
United States cannot "admit, as a new State, territory, which did not belong to the
United States when the Constitution was made," but that the United States would
govern such territory as provinces; but noting that, at the Federal Convention, "a strong
opposition would have been made" to this limitation upon admission of states; and in
no case mentioning Native Americans).
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being sovereigns and their having title to land.126 Perhaps the
Framers assumed a different doctrine articulated by European
jurists, that discovery and possession of foreign land by one
European sovereign founded its title vis-ei-vis all other European
nations, 127 or perhaps the Framers accepted its variation, that
126. A. SmrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 653 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (5th ed. 1789) ("Among nations of hunters, the
lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it among the native tribes of North
America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to
defend his society, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other
societies, he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as when he lives
at home. His society, for in this state of things there is properly neither sovereign nor
commonwealth, is at no sort of expence, either to prepare him for the field, or to
maintain him while he is in it."); id. at 669-70 ("Among nations of hunters,... there
is scirce any property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days
labour; .... The acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily
requires the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least
none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not so
necessary."); id. at 735 (hunters, e.g. tribes of North America, are barbarous societies,
not civilized societies); C. INOIS, A MEmoRAL CONCERNING THE IROQUOIS, OR FIn
CoN-EDERATE NATIONS OF INDIANS IN THE PROVINCE OF NEw-YoRK (1771) (describing
their present state, numbers, and situation; adducing arguments why government should
interpose for their conversion to Christianity and reduction to a civilized state; and
presenting a plan for their conversion), reprinted in 4 TEE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 659 (E. O'Callaghan ed. 1851); see J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF G:vERam-rNT: ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL
GovRNmENT §§ 26, 30 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (rev. 3d ed. 1698); 1 C. DE SECONDAT
[BARON DE MoNTsQUIEu], ESPRIT DES Lois [THE SPIRIT OF LAws] bk. 18, chs. 9, 11-
12 (1748) (Native Americans form "savage nations" and are "dispersed clans," "gen-
erally hunters," "not possessed of landed property"); cf. Letter from William Johnson
to Arthur Lee (Feb. 28, 1771), reprinted in 4 TEE DOCUmENTARY HISTORY OF THE STATE
OF NEw YoRx, supra, at 269. But cf. I F. DE VICTORIA, RELECTIONE THEoLoOICA
XII: DE INDIS [TwELvE THEOLOOICAL LECTURES: ON INDIANS] *359-60 (1557) (J. Simon
ed. 1696) ("inhere is another title which can be set up, namely, by right of discovery
.... [T]hose regions which are deserted become, by the law of nations and the natural
law, the property of the first occupant.... Not much, however, need be said about
this third title of ours, because, as proved above, the barbarians were true own-
ers. . . ."), translated in 7 THE CLAssICs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-39 (J. Scott ed.
1917).
127. See E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE
[THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW] bk. 1, § 207 (Ist ed. 1758),
translated in 4-3 THE CLAsSICs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (J. Scott ed. 1916) ("When
... a. Nation finds a country uninhabited and without an owner, it may lawfully take
posse;sion of it, and after it has given sufficient signs of its intention in this respect,
it may not be deprived of it by another Nation. In this way navigators setting out upon
voyages of discovery and bearing with them a commission from their sovereign, when
coming across ... uninhabited lands, have taken possession of them in the name of
their Nation; and this title has usually been respected, provided actual possession has
followed shortly after."); cf. G.F. VON MARTENS, PRECIS DU DRorr DES GENS MODERNE
DE L'EUROPE FoNDt SUR LES TRArES ET L'USAoE [PRECIS OF THE LAW OF MODERN
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the English Crown had discovered and was thus sovereign over
the American colonies, subject only to the rights of Native
Americans to occupy the territory'28-which sovereignty Great
Britain had ceded with her title129 to the states in the Treaty of
Paris. 130 A fourth possibility is that the Framers assumed that
EuRoPEaN NATIONS, FOUNDED ON TH TR.Anms AND CusToMs] bk. IV, ch. IV, § 2 (W.
Cobbett trans. 1803) (1788) ("To claim the sole property of a thing, a person must, 1.
have been able to hold it legitimately, and must have a good reason for his exclusive
possession. This reason may be founded on the inutility of the thing, if its use remained
in common, or on the security of the possessor's property, already lawfully acquired,
which may require an exclusive possession of something, which, of itself, he would not
want. 2. It must have been effectively possessed, that is to say, seized with an intention
to be kept. 3. The claimant must be in a situation to maintain the possession of the
thing claimed.").
128. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, § 209 ("There is another ... question
which has arisen principally in connection with the discovery of the New World[,] ...
whether a nation may lawfully occupy any part of a vast territory in which are to be
found only wandering tribes whose small numbers can not populate the whole coun-
try.... [T]hese tribes can not take to themselves more land than they have need of or
can inhabit and cultivate. Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions can not be
held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the Nations of Europe, which
are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no special need of
and are making no present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession
of them and establish colonies in them."); cf. id. bk. 1, §§ 204-205 ("When a Nation
takes possession of a country which belongs to no one, it is considered as acquiring
sovereignty [right of supreme jurisdiction] over it as well as ownership [right of exclusive
use and alienation]; for, being free and independent, it can not intend, when it settles
a territory, to leave to others the right to rule it, nor any other right which belongs to
sovereignty. The entire space over which a Nation extends its sovereignty forms the
sphere of its jurisdiction, and is called its domain."). But see J. LocKE, supra note
126, § 9 ("'Tis certain their Laws [of "any Prince or State"] by vertue of any Sanction
they receive from the promulgated Will of the Legislative, reach not a Stranger. They
speak not to him, nor if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The Legislative
Authority, by which they are in Force over the Subjects of that Common-wealth, hath
no Power over him. Those who have the Supream Power of making Laws in England,
France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the World, Men without
Authority: .... "); H. DE GROOT [H. GRoTrus], DE Juan BEM AC PAciS Lmiu Tans
[ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE iN TEE BooKs] bk. 2, ch. 3, § IV (rev. ed. 1646)
(when colonies take land from neighboring territories and assign it to colonists, "juris-
diction over the lands which were assigned nevertheless remained under the control of
those from whose territory they were taken"), translated in 3-2 THE CLAssIcs OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (J. Scott ed. 1925); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 542 (1832) (dictum); cf. G.F. VON MARTENS, supra note 127, bk. IV, ch. IV,
§ 2 ("But all empire, when separated from property, supposes the consent, express or
tacit, of those over whom it is to be exercised.").
129. Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1763, France-Great Britain-Spain, arts. 4, 7, 42
CONSoLmATED TREATY SERs 279, 324, 325 (C. Parry ed. 1969).
130. Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, arts. 1-2, 8 Stat.
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Native Americans were a conquered people, subject to the sov-
ereignty of the conqueror.13 1 Finally, perhaps they adopted the
principle of natural law, that Native Americans never occupied
the land by cultivation and use, but moved from place to place
in hunting and gathering, and therefore their use was not exclu-
sive and could not subordinate possession by a people of cul-
tivators. 3 2 In short, perhaps the Framers had already presumed
80, 81-82; cf. Treaty with the Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, United States-Shawnee
Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 26, 26 ("The Shawanoe nation do acknowledge the United States
to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all the territory ceded to them by a treaty of
peace, made between them and the King of Great Britain, the fourteenth day of January,
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four.").
131. Campbell v. Hall [Grenada Case], 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047, 1 Cowper's Rep.
204, 208 (K.B. 1774) (finding as propositions "too clear to be controverted" that "[a]
country conquered by British arms becomes a dominion of the king in the right of his
crom; and, therefore, necessarily subject to the legislature, the parliament of Great
Britain," that "the conquered inhabitants once received under the king's protection,
become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or
aliens," that "the law and legislative government of every dominion, equally affects all
persons and all property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all
questions which arise there," and that "the laws of a conquered country continue in
forca, until they are altered by the conqueror"); Calvin v. Smith [Calvin's Case], 77
Eng. Rep. 377, 398, 7 Coke's Rep. la, 17b (Ex. Ch. 1609) ("[Iff a Christian King
should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his subject, there ipso
facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated.., and in that case, until certain laws be
established amongst them, the King ... shall judge them and their causes according to
natural equity. . . ."). Contra J. LocKE, supra note 126, §§ 176, 180-187 (conquest by
an unjust war conveys no title, and conquest in a lawful war, that is, one against the
unjust use of force, entails absolute power over the people conquered but no right or
title to their estates or possessions).
132. W. CRONON, supra note 123, at 55-58; 1 C. DE SECONDAT, supra note 126, bk.
18, chs. 9, 11-12; E. DE VATrnL, supra note 127, bk. 1, §§ 207, 209; J. W'iNmRoP,
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE PLANTATION iN NEw ENGLAND 7 (Old South Leaflets No. 50,
1894) (1629 or 1630) ("And for the Natives in New England they inclose noe land
neither have any setled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe
have noe other but a naturall right to those countries Soe as if wee leave them sufficient
for their use wee may lawfully take the rest, there being more then enough for them &
us."); accord Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 wheat.) 543, 569-
70 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810) (Native Americans
did not have exclusive use of the land, and Georgia could grant to others absolute title
to land that Native Americans occupied); see 2 W. BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *3-4 (G. Tucker ed. 1803); J. LocKx, supra note 126, §§ 26-27, 29,
31, 34-38; S. VON PuEENDoRE, DE Jur NATURAE ET GaNTum Lair Ocro [Oi im
LAw OF NATuRE AND NATIONs in ExoHT BOOKs] bk. 4, ch. 6, § 3 (2d ed. 1688), translated
in 17-2 THE CLAssIcs OF I--ERNATIONAL LAW 570 (J. Scott ed. 1934) ("Regarding
occupancy ... of lands, it must be carefully considered whether it is made by one
perscn, or by several at the same time. Any single individual is held to have occupied
land when he undertakes to cultivate it, or marks out its boundaries. Yet it is understood
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on the basis of one or more of these principles that the United
States was sovereign over Native American tribes and lands-
perhaps a commonplace which they saw no need to inscribe in
the Constitution but which Chief Justice Marshall memorialized
in 1823.133
Sovereignty was the central and common problem of the latter
half of the eighteenth century' 34 (according to histories that limit
that he will not embrace more than what one family... can defend."). But cf. H. DE
GROOT, supra note 128, bk. 2, ch. 2, §§ II, XVII ("Again, if within the territory of a
people there is any deserted and unproductive soil, this also ought to be granted to
foreigners if they ask for it. Or it is right for foreigners even to take possession of such
ground, for the reason that uncultivated land ought not to be considered as occupied
except in respect to sovereignty, which remains unimpaired in favour of the original
people"); S. voN PuFENoRF, supra, bk. 4, ch. 6, §§ 3-4 ("But when a group of men
have together occupied some portion of land, this has usually been done ... when a
group of men take under possession some desert tract of land, the bounds of which
have been fixed either by nature of by the decision of men .... '[O]ccupancy as a
whole' ... establishes dominion for the whole group, as such, over all things in that
district, not merely immovables, but also moveables, and animal life, or at least the
right to use the last named to the exclusion of all others.... [I]f anything be discovered
in such an area that is still without a private owner, it should not at once be regarded
as unoccupied, and free to be taken by any man as his own, but it will be understood
to belong to the whole people."). Therefore, the principle of Mr. von Pufendorf
concerning cultivation applied only in cases of individuals, but did not apply to Native
American tribes, who held land in common.
133. See Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585-86,
591-92 (1823). The Court held that the United States had absolute title to the lands
occupied by Native Americans under the doctrine of discovery. Id. at 588. In dictum,
Chief Justice Marshall iterated that, according to public policy but not law, conquered
occupants "shall not be wantonly oppressed" but shall be assimilated or safely governed
as a distinct people, if such assimilation and governance consisted with the purposes of
the sovereign. However, he also opined that Native Americans
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country,
was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people,
was impossible ....
That law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations
between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application to a
people under such circumstances.
Id. at 589-91.
134. See generally T. A mwE=, WESmEN LANDS AND THE Ammic~A REVOLTuON
(1937) (describing the practical politics of determining sovereignty in the Western lands);
1 J. Goeem, JR., HISTORY OF Tn Supmam CouRT oF Tm Urn= STATES: ANTECEENTlS
AND BEGINNINOS TO 1801, at 182-95 (1971) (describing adjudication under auspices of
the Continental Congress of disputes about territorial limits); M. JENSEN, THE ARTiCLES
OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOcIAL-CoNsITUTIoNAL HISTORY OP
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at 150-76 (1940); F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SEcLORuM: Tan INTIJXCTUA, Ouons OF Ta CONSUT ON 145-52 (1985) (discussing
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their subject matter to politics, wars, and statesmen). Who was
sovereign over the territory of Native Americans illustrated the
problem. 135 The Framers never enquired during the Federal Con-
vention whether Native Americans were sovereigns of these
lands. 36 Instead, their deliberations and machinations only con-
cerned whether individual states or the United States had or
should have sovereignty and jurisdiction of the "Western lands,"
those between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi
River. 13
Julius Goebel has noted that the states used the law of nations
to resolve controversies among the thirteen commensurate juris-
dictions after the Revolutionary War. 38 The starting point was
the proposition that each state was sovereign within and through-
out the limits specified in its antecedent colonial charter. Char-
ters of New Hampshire, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plaatations, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland,
and Delaware specified definite limits. 39 The charters of Mas-
the various theoretical formulations of whether and how the colonies assumed sovereignty
upon declaring independence); P. ONw, Tam ORIoINs oF nT FEDERAL REPUBLIC:
JURIuDIcTIoNAL CoNTRovERsxas IN THE UITED STATES 1775-1787 (1983); 1 F. PRUCHA,
supra, note 12, at 11-18, 21-28 (describing various methods with which colonists dispos-
sessed Native Americans of land and various theories offered to justify them); G. WOOD,
Tam 'CREATION OF THE AmERicAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969) (discussing the
development of the principle that sovereignty resided in the people).
1"15. E.g., Report of [the Committee] on Indians Affairs in the Southern Department,
reprinted in 27 J. CoTINErrNTAL CoNG. 453 (0. Hunt ed. 1928) (May 28, 1784) [here-
inafter Southern Department 1784 Indian Affairs Committee Report]; Report of the
Committee To Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on Indian Affairs in the Northern
and Middle Departments, reprinted in 25 J. CONTINENTAL CONO. 680 (G. Hunt ed.
1922) (Oct. 15, 1783); Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31
Buau'kuo L. REv. 635, 714-19 (1982); W. Johnson, Review [for the Earl of Shelburne]
of the Trade and Affairs of the Indians in the Northern District of America (Sept. 22,
1767), reprinted in 7 DocmtENrns RELATrVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF
Naw-YoRx 953, 958-59 (E. O'Callaghan ed. 1856); see Proclamation of Sept. 22, 1783,
reprinted in 25 J. CoNTINENTAL CoNe. 602 (G. Hunt ed. 1922); Proclamation of Oct. 7,
1763 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 Tam AmmucAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A Docu-
m rr.kY HISroR 2315 (W. Washburn ed. 1973); see also Thomas, Introduction to
INDIAN LAND CESSioNS IN THE UNITED STATES, 18 U.S. BUR. OF Ams. ETHNOLOGY ANN.
REP. pt. 2, H.R. Doc. No. 736, 56th Cong., Ist Sess. 527 (C. Royce ed. 1899).
136. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
137. The reader will find maps useful to understanding the problems of territorial
jurisdiction discussed below in ATLAS OF EARLY AmucAN HISTORY: THE REvOLuTioNARY
ERA, 1760-1790, at 16-18 (L. Cappon ed. 1976).
138. 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 134, at 46-47.
139. Grant to the Duke of York (Oct. 30, 1712) (charter of territory including New
Jersey), reprinted in 4 Tam FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTITUTIoNs, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
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sachusetts Bay, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia all granted expanses westward "to the
South Sea."' 14
When the colonies denied in 1776 that sovereign powers any
longer originated in the Crown, and then defeated the Crown
in 1783, some states argued that sovereignty vested in each
state, 41 with inequalities of power attending the inequalities of
territory. Other states wanted to limit the extent of another
state's dominion; to accomplish this they had to acknowledge
and to invoke a sovereign power superior to both. 142 Prior to
AD OTHmER ORGANIc LAWS OF THE STATES, TERnoRss, AND CoLoNiES Now oR
HERroFonn FoRmwo Ta UN'rrE STATES OF AMERICA 2590, 2590-91 (F. Thorpe ed.
1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIMT ONS]; Charter of Delaware (1701)
("the Territories of Pennsylvania"), reprinted in 1 THm FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, supra, at 557, 557; Charter of the Province of Pennsylvania (1681), reprinted
in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONs, supra, at 3035, 3036; Grant to Duke of
York (June 6, 1674) (charter of territory including part of the present state of New
York), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTONS, supra, at 1641, 1641;
Charter of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations (1663), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTiTUMONS, supra, at 3211, 3220-21; Charter of Maryland (1632), re-
printed in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTrmONS, supra, at 1677, 1678; Grant of
New Hampshire to Capt. John Mason (Nov. 7, 1629), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTMr ONS, supra, at 2433, 2434.
140. Charter of Georgia (1732), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTrru-
TIONS, supra note 139, at 765, 771; Charter of Carolina (1665) (charter of territory
including North Carolina and South Carolina), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUONS, supra note 139, at 2761, 2762-63; Charter of Connecticut (1662), re-
printed in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTrrtmONs, supra note 139, at 529, 535;
Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUtIoNs, supra note 139, at 1846, 1850; Charter of Virginia (1612) ("from Sea to Sea
West and North-west"), reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 139, at 3802, 3803.
141. See The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776); The Articles of
Confederation art. II (U.S. 1781); Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great
Britain, art. 1, 8 Stat. 80, 81.
142. E.g., 1 REcoRns, supra note 13, at 323-24 (June 19, 1787) (statement of Rufus
King, Massachusetts, that the states were not sovereigns, the Union was sovereign, and
Congress could act alone without the states).
The states were assuming and employing the unity of sovereignty. Unitary sovereignty
presumes that political relations and property rights are hierarchical. Property rights,
title, and dominion derive ultimately from one sovereign and are allocated within that
sovereignty. Whatever property right exists, whatever property regime exists, one sov-
ereign establishes it and governs it. In other words, as a philosophical or as a practical
matter, never do two contrary sovereign principles govern the "same" property.
In all cases, it seems, rights in land derive from polity. E.g., I. SuTroN, supra note
123, at 4. The polity, however constituted, of whatever real or theoretical origin, is the
one sovereign. (In earlier times, of course, philosophers or theologians debated whether
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the Revolutionary War, the superior power one petitioned was
the Crown; now states appealed to the Continental Congress to
limt another state's claims in the Western lands. 143 Some states
argaed that, the Western lands being "unlocated and unsettled
when the American revolution took place," they should be
national territory, not territory over which former colonies, now
states, were sovereign. 1"
These fundamental disagreements about the source and extent
of a state's sovereignty elucidate why the Framers expressly
chose not to decide whether the United States, the individual
states, or neither had jurisdiction over Native Americans' lands
and therefore could govern them. Instead, the Framers were
"for doing nothing in the constitution in the present case, and
for leaving the whole matter in Status quo,"' 45 and they deter-
mined that "nothing in this constitution contained, shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims either of the U- S- or
of any particular State."'"
property rights were the province of secular rulers or sacred rulers. In some systems,
all property was governed by one sovereign, either secular or sacred; in others, property
was differentiated into kinds, and the civil government forded over some kinds and God
or the church lorded over other kinds. In the latter cases, strictly, God was sovereign.
See, e.g., McKeon, The Development of the Concept ofProperty in Political Philosophy:
A Study in the Background of the Constitution, 48 INT'L J. Eamcs 297 (1930).)
While in reality the theoretical assumption of unitary sovereignty is often true,
sometimes it is false. In North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
Native Americans had, and European colonists claimed, interests in same places of
North America. Native Americans, however, had no concept of title to land. "[L]and
was not regarded as property; it was like the air, it was something necessary to the life
of the race, and therefore not to be appropriated by any individual or group of
individuals to the permanent exclusion of all others." Fletcher, supra note 123, at 756.
When Native Americans shared with colonists the land they used, they had no sense
that they were conveying a property right within a property system under one political
or tenitorial sovereign. Any agreements they reached with European nations did not
suddenly create a system of property rights grounded in a premise of unitary sovereignty.
For Native Americans, land was not political in this sense; "property" was social and
sacred. See, e.g., W. CRONON, supra note 123, at 54-81, 227-28; I. SurroN, supra note
123, at 5. See generally id. at 24-27.
143. M. JmsN, supra note 134, at 151.
144. Martin, supra note 85, reprinted in 3 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 226; e.g., T.
PAINE, PUBLIC GOOD: BaNO AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CLAIM OF VEROINIA TO THE
VACANT WEsTRN TERRITORY, AND OF Tim RxonT OF THE UNmTD STATES TO TIE SAME
(1780), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINos OF THOMAS PA.E 304 (P. Foner ed.
1945); cf. I RECORDS, supra note 13, at 541 (July 6, 1787) (statement of Rufus King,
Massachusetts, that the federal government was sovereign of the North West Territory).
145. 2 REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 462 (Aug. 30, 1787) (statement of Hugh William-
son, North Carolina).
146. Id. at 466 (Aug. 30, 1787) (motion of Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania); accord
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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The original understanding probably did not comprehend any
theory of sovereign power, federal or state, over Native Amer-
ican nations. Either none of the theories of sovereignty cata-
logued above informed the original understanding, because article
IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution intentionally excluded
each of them; 47 or this clause addressed only competing claims
between the United States and individual states without denying
that one or the other exercised jurisdiction over Native American
territory or peoples. In either case, states still could not exercise
jurisdiction over Native American tribes "within" their limits;'1
4
by the same reasoning, neither could the national government
exercise jurisdiction over Native American territory or peoples
"within" the United States. 49
Even the several contemporary theories, or fictions, of sov-
ereignty would not justify national or state sovereignty over
Native American lands. The doctrine of discovery was a con-
venient one of them; however, it governed priority of title among
European nations, not between Native Americans and the British
or Americans, '50 and it established title to uninhabited, not
147. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cI. 2 ("and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State").
148. See supra notes 47, 54, 63 and accompanying text.
149. The Supreme Court applies analogous reasoning to Native American tribes.
Tribes cannot exercise jurisdiction over people who are not members of the tribe or
over lands located within the reservation but owned in fee by persons who are not
members of tribe. E.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Tribe generally does not have zoning
power over Native American lands owned in fee by non-members); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (Crow Tribe may prohibit or regulate hunting or fishing
by non-members on lands belonging to the Tribe, but it has no power to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-members on lands located within the reservation but owned
in fee by non-members); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over offenses by non-members on
reservations). By the same reasoning, states and the United States would not be able to
exercise jurisdiction over persons who were not members of the state or the United
States (Native Americans) or over lands located "within" the state or the United States
but held by persons who were not members of the state or the United States (Native
Americans' lands).
150. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 'Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823);
accord Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44, 546, 559 (1832) (dictum);
see E. DE VATTEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, §§ 204-205, 207 (generally, other nations may
not deprive the discovering nation of the new territory); cf. Notes of a Conversation
[of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State] with Mr. [George] Hammond [British Minister]
(June 7, 1792), reprinted in 1 THE WrYNGs oF THOMAS JFssuRSoN 193, 196-97 (P. Ford
ed. 1892) (pursuant to the law of nations, the United States had a "right of preemption"
of the lands of Native Americans). But cf. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, § 209
No. 1]
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inhabited territory.51 Another theory posited that Native Amer-
icans, being in a state of nature, could not be sovereigns of
their lands; yet it was argued with equal vigor that the colonies,
upon revolution, reverted to a state of nature.5 2 It was asserted
that Native Americans were a conquered people, subject to the
sovereignty of the conqueror; yet the assertion was mere rhet-
oric. 5 1 It was asserted that Native Americans did not use and
cultivate the land and therefore, under principles of natural law,
could not be sovereign of it or exclude others from using it;
but failure to use and cultivate the land did not suffice to deny
the Crown's claims to unsurveyed lands, viz. the colonial grants
and charters extending to the "South Sea.' ' 5 4 Furthermore, the
United States had recognized property rights in Native Ameri-
cans.
55
Such logical inconsistencies do not preclude inconsistent po-
litical choices to adopt the fiction anyway, and the Constitution
(add-essing specifically the powers of European nations with respect to the territory of
Native Americans, European nations may lawfully take possession of certain lands of
Native Americans and establish colonies upon them).
151. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, §§ 204-205, 207; see H. DE GROOT, supra
note 128, bk. 2, ch. 2, § XVII, ch. 3, § IV; J. Loccn, supra note 126, § 9; 1 F.
Vic-riug, supra note 126, at *359-60; cf. G.F. VON MARTENs, supra note 127, at 161.
But f. 1 C. DE SECoNDAT, supra note 126, bk. 18, chs. 11-13; A. SaTH, supra note
126, at 653; E. DE VATTEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, § 209.
152. F. McDoNALD, supra note 134, at 144-47; e.g., I REcoRDs, supra note 13, at
324 (June 19, 1787) (statement of Luther Martin, Maryland). Contra id. at 324-25
(June 19, 1787) (statement of Alexander Hamilton, New York).
153. W. Johnson, supra note 135, reprinted in 7 DocuMENTs RELATnVE TO THE
COLOIAL HISToRY oF THE STATE OF NEw-YoRx, supra note 135, at 958-59. Cf. Report
of Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to [George Washington,] the President of the United
States, Relative to the Northwestern Indians (June 15, 1789), reprinted in 2-1 AMERICAN
STAT I PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 12, 13. See infra text accompanying
notes 168-74.
154. Mensch, supra note 135, passim & 686-87 (describing the conflicts in New York
between title based on use and occupancy and title based on grants of the Crown).
Compare H. DE GROOT, supra note 128, bk. 2, ch. 2, §§ II, XVII; S. VoN PUFENDORP,
supra note 132, bk. 4, ch. 6, §§ 3-4.
155. E.g., [Northwest] Ordinance of July 13, 1787, art. 3, reprinted in 32 J. CON-
TINENTAL CONe. 334, 340-41 (R. Hill ed. 1936), ratified in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a.; Articles of Confederation-First Draft, supra note 27, arts.
XIV, XVIII; Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note
47, at 458; Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs in the Northern Department,
reprinted in 33 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 477, 478 (R. Hill ed. 1936) (Aug. 9, 1787)
[hereinafter Northern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report]; Report of
Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of the United States, Relative to the
Northwestern Indians, supra note 153, reprinted in 2-1 AlmiucAN STATE PA ERs: INDIAN
AslAuts, supra note 91, at 13.
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abounds with inconsistency; but given the inapplicability, logi-
cally, of these theories of sovereignty and the express exclusion
of them in article IV of the Constitution, imputing to the
Framers an unarticulated choice and incorporation of any of
them should require evidence of the choice, not just evidence
of their availability. Much better evidence is found in the delib-
erations of the Continental Congress.
B. The Proceedings of the Continental Congress
The first draft of the Articles of Confederation stated that
"A perpetual Alliance, offensive and defensive, is to be entered
into by the United States assembled as soon as may be, with
the Six Nations, and all other neighbouring Nations of Indians;
their Limits to be ascertained, their Lands to be secured to them,
and not encroached on; . ... ,,56 The provision was removed 5
7
(although one discovers its echo in the treaty with the Delaware
Nation in 1778118). In conjunction, the first draft would have
vested in the United States a
sole and exclusive Right and Power of .. .Limiting
the Bounds of those Colonies, which by Charter or
Proclamation, or under any pretence, are said to ex-
tend to the South Sea, and ascertaining those Bounds
of any other Colony that appear to be indeterminate-
Assigning Territories for new Colonies, either in Lands
to be thus separated from Colonies and heretofore
purchased or obtained by the Crown of Great-Britain
from the Indians, or hereafter to be purchased or
obtained from them- .... 159
Thus, the first draft would not enact nor anticipate any of the
theories of sovereignty that politicians subsequently asserted.
The recorded debate about this provision presented more
diverse views. One member of the Continental Congress from
Virginia claimed that some Native American nations were trib-
utary to Virginia.16 Thomas Jefferson opined that some Native
Americans were living in a colony and thus were subject to its
156. Articles of Confederation-First Draft, suprh note 27, art. XIV, at 549.
157. See Articles of Confederation-Second Draft, supra note 27, at 679-80 col. 2.
158. Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Na-
tion, art. 6, 7 Stat. 13, 14.
159. Articles of Confederation-First Draft, supra note 27, art. XVIII, at 550-51.
160. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July
26, 1776) (statements of Carter Braxton, Virginia), reprinted in 6 J. CoN rNrT.A CONG.
1077 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
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laws.' 61 James Wilson argued, on the other hand, that the United
States had "no right over the Indians, whether within or without
the real or pretended limits of any Colony .... Grants made
three thousand miles to the eastward, have no validity with the
Indians." 62
Once the Revolutionary War was fought, in which Native
Americans generally allied with Great Britain,'63 and the Treaty
of Paris was signed, a new theory of sovereignty with respect
to Native Americans was announced, one based on conquest
and cession instead of purchase. Great Britain ceded to the
colonies its title (whatever its title) to the territory between the
Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi River, 164 territory upon which
Native Americans had lived long before 1608. This Treaty of
Paris did not settle the conflicts between colonists and Native
Americans. 165 Nonetheless, the colonists equated victory over
Great Britain with conquest of the Native Americans and the
lands upon which they lived. The Continental Congress of 1783
claimed sovereignty on the basis of cession and conquest:
[The committee believe ... that they [Native Amer-
icans] are not in a temper to relinquish their territorial
claims, without further struggles. That if an Indian
war should be rekindled, repeated victories might pro-
duce the retreat of the Indians, but could not prevent
them from regaining possession of some part of the
distant lands and extensive territories, which appertain
to the United States; .... That ... it is just and
necessary that lines of property should be ascertained
and established between the United States and them,
which will be convenient to the respective tribes, and
161. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statements of Thomas Jefferson, Virginia), reprinted in 6 J. CONTINENTAL CONG.
1077, 1077-78 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
162. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statements of James Wilson, Pennsylvania), reprinted in 6 3. CONTINENTAL CONO.
1077, 1078 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
163. See 1 F. PRucaA, supra note 12, at 36-50. See generally B. GRAYMONT, Tim
IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1972); W. Mon, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS,
1774-1788, at 37-91 (1933); J. O'DoNNELL III, Sotroq INDIANs IN THE AMmuCAN
REVOL1,JToN (1973).
164. Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, arts. 1-2, 8 Stat.
80, 81-82.
165. E.g., W. MonR, supra note 163, at 93-99; Horsman, American Indian Policy
in the Old Northwest, 1783-1812, 18 WM. & MARY Q. (n.s.) 35 (1961); see Treaty of
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commensurate to the public wants ..... Nor ... can
the Indians themselves have any reasonable objections
against the establishment recommended. They were
... aggressors in the war, without even a pretence of
provocation; .... To stop the progress of their out-
rages, the war, at a vast expence to the United States,
was carried into their own country, which they aban-
doned. Waiving then the right of conquest and the
various precedents which might be quoted in similar
instances, a bare recollection of the facts is sufficient
to manifest the obligation they are under to make
atonement for the enormities which they have perpe-
trated, ... and they possess no other means to do
this act of justice than by a compliance with the
proposed boundaries .... [I]f they should appear dis-
satisfied at the lines which it may be found necessary
to establish, rather to give them some compensation
for their claims than to hazard a war, which will be
much more expensive; .... Whereupon,
Resolved, That a convention be held with the In-
dians residing in the northern and middle departments,
... for the purposes of receiving them into the favor
and protection of the United States, and of establishing
boundary lines of property for separating and dividing
the settlements of the citizens from the Indian villages
and hunting grounds, ....
Secondly, That the Indians be informed that after
a contest of eight years for the sovereignty of this
country Great Britain has relinquished to the United
States all claim to the country within the limits de-
scribed by the second article of the provisional treaty
between the United States and the King of Great
Britain ....
Fourthly, That the following lines shall be proposed
to be mutually agreed upon and established between
the United States and the several tribes of Indians who
shall be affected thereby; ....
Resolved, That the preceding measures of Congress
relative to Indian affairs, shall not be construed to
affect the territorial claims of any of the states, or
their legislative rights within their respective limits.'6
166. Report of the Committee To Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on Indian
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The Continental Congress used this rhetorical version in ne-
gotiations with Native American tribes. 67 The candid conclusions
about sovereignty expressed in the committee's prefatory com-
ments, however, assumed neither title nor conquest. Native
Americans' "own country" must be purchased in treaty; they
were not conquered.es By 1787, the Continental Congress made
these private understandings public, replacing the cant of con-
quest and cession. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided:
Affairs in the Northern and Middle Departments, supra note 135, at 681-82, 683-84,
686, 693; see also Southern Department 1784 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra
note 135 (asserting like principles and proposing like resolutions with respect to Native
Americans nations in the southern department). But see Resolution of May 1, 1783,
reprinted in 24 J. CoNTnNTAL. CoNG. 319 (G. Hunt ed. 1922), in which the Continental
Congress resolved to
inform the several Indian nations, on the frontiers of the United States,
that preliminary articles of peace have been agreed on, and hostilities have
ceased with Great Britain, and to communicate to them that ... the
United States are disposed to enter into friendly treaty with the different
tribes; and to inform the hostile Indian nations that unless they cease all
hostilities against the citizens of these states, and accept of these friendly
proffers of peace, Congress will take the most decided measures to compel
them thereto ....
Id. at 319-20. This resolution did not presume that the Native American tribes were
already conquered.
167. E.g., Treaty with the Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, United States-Shawnee
Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 26, 26; H. MALEY, supra note 91, at 23-24; Horsman, supra
note 165, at 38-39; Speech of David Ramsay, Chairman of the Congress of the United
States, to Cornplanter, of the Seneca Nation, reprinted in 30 J. CONTINENTAL CoNa.
235, 235 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934) (May 5, 1786) ("The United States alone possess the
sovereign power within the limits described at the late Treaty of peace between them
and the King of England .... You [Cornplanter] may also assure the Indians that they
tell lies, who say that the King of England has not in his late Treaty with the United
States given up, to them the lands of the Indians."). Compare Treaty with the Cherokee
Nation, May 20, 1777, Georgia-South Carolina-Cherokee Nation, art. 1, reprinted in 8-
1 Amm cA STATE PAPERs: Putauc LANDs 51, 52 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds. 1832)
("The Cherokee nation acknowledge that the troops ... did effect and maintain the
conquest of all the Cherokee lands eastward of the Unacaye mountain; and to and for
their people did acquire, possess, and yet continue to hold, in and over the said lands,
all and singular rights incidental to conquest: and the Cherokee nation, in consequence
thereof, do cede the said lands to the said people, the people of South Carolina.").
168. See also H. MANLEY, supra note 91, at 23-32; Letter from George Washington,
Commander-in-Chief, Continental Army, to James Duane, Chairman, Committee to
Confer with the Commander in Chief, Continental Congress (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted
in 27 TBE WmriNos op GEORGE WASHINGTON 133 (. Fitzpatrick ed. 1938); Letter from
Philip Schuyler, Commissioner on Indian Affairs, to President of Congress (July 29,
1783), in PAPERs OF THE CONTINENTAL CoNGREsS, 1774-1789, No. 153, at 601, 602-03
(National Archives and Records Service Microfilm No. 247, Roll No. 173, 1959).
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The utmost good faith shall always be observed to-
wards the Indians, their lands and property shall never
be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded
or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised
by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs
being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them. 169
In 1787, a committee of the Continental Congress "conceive
that it has been long the opinion of the country, supported by
Justice and humanity, that the Indians have just claims to all
lands occupied by and not fairly purchased from them; .... ,,170
Another committee claimed that Native American tribes in the
Northwest Territory were within the "power and limits" of the
United States, but proceeded to conclude, "may it not be politic
and Just to treat with the Indians more on a footing of equality,
... and instead of attempting to give lands to the Indians to
proceed on the principle of fairly purchasing of them and taking
the usual deeds? 17 1 Secret instructions to the Governor of the
Northwest Territory also recognized Native Americans' inde-
pendent "sovereignty":
Altho' the purchase of the Indian right of Soil is
not a primary object of holding this Treaty, yet you
will not Neglect any opportunity that may Offer of
extinguishing the Indian rights to the Westward as far
as the River Mississippi.
You may stipulate that the East and West line Or-
dered to be run by the Ordinance of the 20th May
1785 shall be the boundary between the United States
and the Indian tribes; provided they stipulate that it
shall run throughout unto the River Mississippi, .... 172
169. [Northwest] Ordinance of July 13, 1787, art. 3, reprinted in 32 J. CONTMNENTAL
CONe. 334, 340-41 (R. Hill ed. 1936), ratified in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 3, 1
Stat. 50, 51 n.a.
170. Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note 47,
at 458; e.g., Northern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note
155, at 478.
171. Northern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note 155,
at 478-80. See also Southern Department 1784 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra
note 135, at 455-56.
172. Instructions to the Governor of the Northwest Territory, reprinted in 33 J.
CornmrrnA. CoNG. 711, 712 (R. Hill ed. 1936) (Oct. 26, 1787); Ordinance of May 20,
1785, reprinted in 28 J. CONTIENTAL CONG. 375 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933). The boundary
line is mapped in ATLAs op EARY AaramcAN HIsToRY: THE REvoLuTONARY ERA, 1760-
1790, supra note 137, at 61.
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It is probable that the members of the Continental Congress
acknowledged these understandings publicly because Native
Americans did not acquiesce in the Congress' conceit'73 and
instead were ready to war-an event the fledgling government
could ill-afford. 7 4
Ihese decisions by the Continental Congress might admit of
a second interpretation, that the United States might not have
desisted from pretensions of sovereignty but in stead might have
changed from a policy of assuming ownership of land by eminent
domain to a policy of assuming it by purchase. Sovereignty did
not necessarily entail ownership per se, but the sovereign always
had jurisdiction to define, regulate, and take property and prop-
erty rights. 75 The excerpts above do not resolve this speculative
question unambiguously, for they mingle Realpolitiks and blus-
173. Notes of John Adams on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress (July 26,
1776) (statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania), reprinted in 6 J. CONTImNTAL CoNe.
1077, 1078 (W. Ford ed. 1906); W. MoR, supra note 163, at 93-163; 1 F. PRUCHA,
supra note 12, at 45; Horsman, supra note 165, at 35-39. Compare Letter from Sir
William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, Board of Trade (Oct. 1764), reprinted in 7
DocENmmrS RmATrvE To Tim CoLOIAuL IHsrY OF E STATE OF Nuw-YoRuc, supra
note 135, at 665 ("I must beg leave to observe, that the Six Nations, Western Indians,
ettc, having never been conquered, either by the English or French, nor subject to the
Laws, consider themselves as a free people.").
174. E.g., Northern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note
155, at 477-80; Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note
47, at 456-58; Southern Department 1784 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra note
135, at 455-56.
175. F. McDoNALD, supra note 134, at 10-36, 147-54; Mensch, supra note 135; G.F.
VON MAsTENs, supra note 127, at 160-61 ("Empire may be joined to property ... but
it may also be separated from it, and may extend over a thing which is the property
of others .... "); Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Goveinment, 1789-1910, 33 J. EcoN. HsT. 232 (1973), reprinted in AmEucAN LAw
AND , mE CONSnTUTIONAL Owm: HSTORICAL PERSPECTrVES 132 (L. Friedman & H.
Scheiber eds. 1978); Report by Lords of Trade (Eng. Nov. 23, 1761) (acknowledging
"solemn compacts by which they [Native Americans] had yielded to us the Dominion,
but not the property of those Lands"), reprinted in 7 DochmNS REATrVE TO Ti
CoLoruL HISToRY OF ma STATE OF NEw-Yopx, supra note 135, at 473; e.g., Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525-29 (1982); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 386-95 (1926); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532
(1848). But see H. DE GROT, supra note 128, bk. 2, ch. 3, § IV (when colonies take
land from neighboring territories and assign it to colonists, "jurisdiction over the lands
which were assigned nevertheless remained under the control of those from whose
territory they were taken"); J. LocKE, supra note 126, §§ 176, 180-87 (conquest by an
unjust war conveys no title, and conquest in a lawful war entails absolute power over
the people conquered but no right or title to their estates or possessions); cf. G.F. VON
MARTENs, supra note 127, at 161 ("But all empire, when separated from property,
supposes the consent, express or tacit, of those over whom it is to be exercised.").
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss1/3
No. 1] THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 105
ter; the evidence strongly suggests that the United States was
not sovereign and did not pretend to sovereignty.
Basically, the Continental Congress recognized that Native
Americans would not "relinquish their territorial claims.' 1 76 The
members therefore directed national policy towards determining
boundaries "between the United States and the Indian tribes.'
'7 7
Takings and cessions of territory were to be accomplished by
war or by treaty between sovereigns, not by legislative or judicial
process under one sovereign. The principles and solutions pro-
posed between 1776 and 1787 evince an understanding that
Native Americans could and did hold the right to their lands.
The United States had no territorial nor personal jurisdiction
over the independent nations of Native Americans, just as the
states did not.
178
C. Treaties with Native American Nations
The Supreme Court of the United States has also relied upon
treaties between the United States and various Native American
nations to assert that the latter lost their "sovereignty" to the
national government. 79
176. Report of the Committee To Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on Indian
Affairs in the Northern and Middle Departments, supra note 135, at 681; see supra text
accompanying note 173.
177. Instructions to the Governor of the Northwest Territory, reprinted in 33 J.
CoNTWENTAL CoNG. 711, 712 (R. Hill ed. 1936) (Oct. 26, 1787).
178. In 1789, Henry Knox concurred:
The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It
cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the right
of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other
principle, would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature,
and of that distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.
Report of Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to the President of the United States, Relative
to the Northwestern Indians, supra note 153, reprinted in 2-1 A AmucA STATE PAPERS:
INDiAN AttAins, supra note 91, at 13. His report later mentions that the United States
had already "come into the possession of sovereignty, and an extensive territory." Id.
The Treaty of Paris "absolutely invested them [Congress] with the fee of all the Indian
lands within the limits of the United States." Id. Native Americans, however, maintained
that "they were the only rightful proprietors of the soil." Id. "Congress so far
conformed to the idea, as to appropriate a sum of money solely to the purpose of
extinguishing the Indian claims to lands they had ceded to the United States .... The
principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess ... [was] thus conceded .... .
Id.
179. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959) ("Through conquest and
treaties they [Indian tribes] were induced to give up complete independence and the
right to go to war in exchange for federal protection, aid, and grants of land."); cf.
Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 581-85 (1823)
(discussing treaties among European nations and stating that they ceded title and
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Prior to 1787, colonial and state governments understood that
Native American tribes have the right and power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations. 180 For example, following the dec-
laration of independence in 1776 and before the Constitution's
enactment, the United States entered into a treaty with the
Delaware Nation "guarantee[ing] to the aforesaid nation of
Delawares, and their heirs, all their teritoreal rights in the fullest
and most ample manner, as it hath been bounded by former
treaties."''l One of the most interesting passages in this treaty
sovereignty of lands upon which Native Americans lived). But cf. Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-52, 560-61 (1832) (placing themselves under the protection of
the United States did not imply "claims to their lands," "dominion over their persons,"
or "surrender of their national character").
1110. See Act of Mar. 1, 1788, ch. 47, 1788 N.Y. Laws 100 (authorizing treaties
between New York and Native Americans); Draft [by the Lords of Trade for King
Goor.ge III] of an Instruction for the Governors of Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, New
York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia Forbidding Them to Grant
Lands or To Make Settlements Which May Interfere With the Indians Bordering on
These Colonies (Eng. Dec. 7, 1761), reprinted in 7 DocummNTs RELATrvE TO THE
CoLowAL HisroRy oF THE STATE OF Naw-YoRx, supra note 135, at 478.
For examples of this understanding, see Treaty with the Oneida Nation (Treaty of
Fort Schuyler), Sept. 22, 1788, New York-Oneida Nation, cited in Oneida Indian Nation
of New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1148 (2d Cir. 1988); Treaty with the Creek
Nation (Treaty of Shoulder-bone), Nov. 3, 1786, Georgia-Creek Nation, reprinted In 2
DocuarrniRY HISToRY oF THE FiRsT FEDRA L CONGRESS, supra note 91, at 180; Treaty
with the Cherokee Nation, May 20, 1777, Georgia-South Carolina-Cherokee Nation,
reprinted in 8-1 AmamucAN STATE PAPERS: PuBuc LANDS, supra note 167, at 51; Treaty
of Easton, Oct. 24, 1758, New Jersey-Pennsylvania-Oneida Nation-Onondaga Nation-
Mohawk Nation-Seneca Nation-Tuscarora Nation-Cayuga Nation, reprinted in MINUTEs
OF CONFERENCES, HEL AT EASTON, IN OCTOBER, 1758, WrTn THE Camu SACHEMS AND
WARRIORS OF THE MOHAWKS, ONEMOES, ONONDAGOES, CAYuGAS, SENACAS, TuScARoRAS,
TUTEXoES, SKANIADARADIGRONos, CONSISTING OF THE NANTIcoKEs AND CoNoYS, WHO
NOW .wAxE ONE NATION; CHUGNUTs, DELAWARSW , UNAMmS, MAMCKANDERS, OR MO-
reCKoms; MINKs, AND WAPNGERS, OR PumpToNS (B. Franklin & D. Hall, Philadel-
phia, Pa. publ. 1758), reprinted in INDIAN TnAnTrns PunmD By BENjAMIn F ANruN
1736-1762, at 213 (J. Boyd ed. 1938). See also Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs
Conmmittee Report, supra note 47, at 457 (Georgia treated with the Creek Nation, and
Georgia and North Carolina averred that they had the power to treat with Native
Americans); R. BARsH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRmEs AND PomcIAL
LBERry 33 (1980); B. GRiyoYNT, supra note 163, passim (Americans continually
negotiated with Indian tribes to persuade them not to ally with the British); W. MoHR,
supra note 163, at 109-10, 140-51 (negotiations and treaties initiated by Spain, Georgia,
New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia); J. O'DoNNE,, III, supra note
163, passim (same).
181. Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Na-
tion, art. 6, 7 Stat. 13, 14. The article expressly denied the allegation that the United
States "design[ed] ... to extirpate the Indians and take possession of their country."
Id.
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agreed that the states and the Delaware Nation each became
allies of the other "if either of the parties are engaged in a just
and necessary war with any other nation or nations."' 1 The
treaty even provided that all Native American tribes could form
a state together and join the confederation with representation
in Congress. 83 A treaty with the Cherokee Nation in 1785
contained a like provision.'?4 In such provisions the colonies,
the states, and the federal government recognized Native Amer-
ican tribes and nations as sovereigns, not "domestic dependent
nations ... in a state of pupilage"-the term later used in Chief
Justice Marshall's trilogy.
85
The Framers might have conceived a difference between trea-
ties with Native Americans and treaties with all other foreign
nations. In practice the Continental Congress derived its au-
thority to conclude treaties with Native Americans from article
IX, paragraph 4, of the Articles of Confederation 6 whereas
paragraph 1 of article IX conferred general authority to conclude
any treaty with any nation. 87 While the Constitution does not
preserve the distinction, the Framers might have assumed it.188
182. Id. art. 2 ("[I]f either of the parties are engaged in a just and necessary war
with any other nation or nations, that then each shall assist the other in due proportion
to their abilities, till their enemies are brought to reasonable terms of accommoda-
tion .. ).
183. Id. art. 6 (inviting the Delawares and other tribes "to join the present confed-
eration, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head, and have
a representation: Provided, nothing contained in this article to be considered as conclu-
sive until it meets with the approbation of Congress.").
184. "That the Indians may have full confidence in the justice of the United States,
respecting their interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice,
whenever they think fit, to Congress." Treaty with the Cherokee Nation (Treaty of
Hopewell), Nov. 28, 1785, United States-Cherokee Nation, art. 12, 7 Stat. 18, 20.
185. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
186. See, e.g., Southern Department 1787 Indian Affairs Committee Report, supra
note 47, at 458; Report of the Committee To Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on
Indian Affairs in the Northern and Middle Departments, supra note 135; Report of the
Committee to Whom Was Committed the Letter from His Excellency the President of
the State of Pennsylvania Respecting a Peace with the Indians, reprinted in 24 J.
CONTINNTAL CONO. 264 (0. Hunt ed. 1922) (Apr. 21, 1783); Proclamation of Sept. 22,
1783, reprinted in 25 J. CoNMnmNTAL CONG. 602 (G. Hunt ed. 1922).
187. The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 1 (U.S. 1781) ("The United States,
in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of ... entering
into treaties and alliances . . . ."), reprinted in 9 J. CoN MrTAL CONG. 907, 915 col.
2 (,V. Ford ed. 1907) (Nov. 15, 1777).
188. Cf. Message from George Washington, President, to the Senate of the United
States (Sept. 17. 1789) (suggesting that the United States conform its procedures for
adoption of treaties with Native American nations to those for ratification of treaties
with European nations, therefore implying that the Constitution does not require the
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Citation to the specific authority of paragraph 4 instead of the
general authority of paragraph 1, however, does not change the
fact that the colonies, the states, and the federal government
recognized Native American tribes and nations as sovereigns,
not dependents.
Native American tribes did accept in treaties (knowingly or
unknowingly) the "protection" of the United States. A treaty
with the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa Nations
in 1785 stated that "The said Indian nations do acknowledge
theraselves and all their tribes to be under the protection of the
United States and of no other sovereign whatsoever."' 8 9 Treaties
with the Cherokee, 19° Choctaw, 191 Chickasaw, 19 and Shawnee'93
Nations included a similar acknowledgement. According to con-
temporary jurists, this protection did not deprive Native Amer-
icans of their "sovereignty" or confer jurisdiction, territorial or
personal, upon the United States. 94 On one occasion, however,
same procedure for both), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECTIV PROCEEDINoS OF THE SENATE
OF THE UmNTED STATES OF AMERICA 26 (1828); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (in a case construing article III and the scope of the judicial power
of the United States, distinguishing Native American nations from foreign states within
the meaning of the entire Constitution).
189. Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa Nations (Treaty of
Fort M0'Intosh), Jan. 21, 1785, United States-Wyandot Nation-Delaware Nation-Chip-
pewa Nation-Ottawa Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 16, 16.
190. Treaty with the Cherokee Nation (Treaty of Hopewell), Nov. 28, 1785, United
States-Cherokee Nation, art. 3, 7 Stat. 18, 19 ("The said Indians for themselves and
their respective tribes and towns do acknowledge all the Cherokees to be under the
protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever.").
191. Treaty with the Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, United States-Choctaw Nation,
art. 2, 7 Stat. 21, 21 ("The Commissioners plenipotentiary of all the Choctaw Nation
do hereby acknowledge the tribes and towns of the said Nation and the lands within
the boundary allotted to the said Indians to live and hunt on as mentioned in the third
article to be under the protection of the United States of America and of no other
Sovereign whosoever.").
192. Treaty with the Chickasaw Nation, Jan. 10, 1786, United States-Chickasaw
Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 24, 24 ("The Commissioners plenipotentiary of the Chickasaws,
do hereby acknowledge the tribes and the towns of the Chickasaw Nation, to be under
the protection of the United States of America and of no other sovereign whosoever.").
193. Treaty with the Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, United States-Shawnee Nation,
art. 5, 7 Stat. 26, 27 ("The United States do grant peace to the Shawanoe nation, and
do receive them into their friendship and protection.").
194.. See H. DE GROOT, supra note 128, bk. 1, ch. 3, § XXI (states being by treaty
under protection of another are nonetheless not under the other state's domination); E.
DE VA'rrEL, supra note 127, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 6 (a state under protection of another does
not give up its sovereignty); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552
(1832) ("protection" entailed only "an engagement to punish aggressions on them
[Indian tribes]," not "claim[s] to their lands" nor "dominion over their persons").
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at the close of the Revolutionary War, members of the Conti-
nental Congress proposed the contrary, that protection of the
Six Nations did entail territorial jurisdiction. 195
Treaties between Native American tribes and the United States
also established in the United States in Congress assembled "the
sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians,
and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think
proper." 196 These generic provisions attempted to implement the
requirements of article IX of the Articles of Confederation 1' -
requirements which the states had continued to ignore.198 By
such provisions, Native American tribes did not relinquish man-
agement of domestic aspects of their trade and affairs. Instead,
195. In 1782, a committee of the Continental Congress concluded "that all the lands
belonging to the Six Nations of Indians, and their tributaries, have been in due form
put under the protection of the Crown of England by the said Six Nations, as appendant
to the late government of New York, so far as respects jurisdiction only." Report of
the Committee on the Cessions of New York, Virginia, Connecticut, and the Petitions
of the Indiana, Vandalia, Illinois, and Wabash Companies, reprinted in 22 J. CoNTi-
NENTAL CoNo. 225, 226 (G. Hunt ed. 1914) (May 1, 1782). The committee had found
that the colony of New York and the Crown of England had always deemed the Six
Nations to be "dependents" of and to be "appendant" to New York. Id. Cession by
New York to the United States would vest "the jurisdiction of the whole western
territory belonging to the Six Nations, and their tributaries, . . . in the United States."
Id. But the report then proposed the resolution,
That nothing herein before determined by Congress, shall be construed so
as to suppose any claim or right in Congress, in point of property of soil,
to any lands belonging to the Indian nations, unless the same have been
bona fide purchased of them by the Crown of England, or which may
hereafter be purchased by the United States in Congress assembled, for
the use of the United States, and that at a public treaty to be held for
that purpose.
Id. at 231-32. This latter resolution informed the subsequent treaty with the Six Nations
in 1784. See Treaty with the Six [Iroquois] Nations (Treaty of Fort Stanwix), Oct. 22,
1784, United States-Oneida Nation-Onondaga Nation-Mohawk Nation-Seneca Nation-
Tuscarora Nation-Cayuga Nation, 7 Stat. 15.
196. Treaty with the Cherokee Nation (Treaty of Hopewell), Nov. 28, 1785, United
States-Cherokee Nation, art. 9, 7 Stat. 18, 20; Treaty with the Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3,
1786, United States-Choctaw Nation, art. 8, 7 Stat. 21, 22 ("For the benefit and comfort
of the Indians and for the prevention of injuries or oppressions on the part of the
Citizens [of the United States] or Indians The United States in Congress assembled shall
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the Trade with the Indians and managing
all their affairs in such manner as they think proper."); Treaty with the Chickasaw
Nation, Jan. 10, 1786, United States-Chickasaw Nation, art. 8, 7 Stat. 24, 25 ("For the
benefit and comfort of the Indians and for the prevention of injuries or apprissions on
the part of the citizens [of the United States] or Indians The United States in Congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the Trade with the
Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper.").
197. The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4 (U.S. 1781).
198. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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tribes promised to treat with the United States rather than with
any state or individual of a state; they would respect the internal
allocation of powers among the United States, the thirteen states,
and citizens'9 declared in the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution.3 ° When the United States and tribes agreed to this
provision on trade and affairs, the United States recognized that
at the same time Native American nations continued to treat
with Great Britain, Spain, and France, and after ratification of
the Constitution, with North Carolina, which had not yet joined
the Union, and over which the United States lacked constitu-
tioral power. 2°1 These principles were reiterated after the Con-
stitution became effective in 1789, in treaties with the Wyandot,
Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Sac Nations;
20 2
the Creek Nation; 203 and the Cherokee Nation .20
Not surprisingly, these treaties were mostly concerned with
the lands of the Native Americans. 2°s Generally, they provided
either that the tribe ceded its land to the United States, or that
the United States allotted land to the tribe, and they defined
certain "property" rights of the tribe. For example, the treaty
with the Delaware Nation stated:
199. Accord Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; The Articles of Confederation art. IX, para. 4
(U.S. 1781).
201. Instructions of George Washington, President of the United States, to Benjamin
Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin and David Humphries, Commissioners on Indian Affairs in the
Southern Department (Aug. 29, 1789) (instructing the Commissioners to determine
whether Spain and the Creek Nation had concluded any treaties), reprinted in 2
DOCL-MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 91, at 202, 208;
Message from George Washington, President, to the Senate of the United States
(Aug. 22, 1789), in 1 JOURNAL OF THE ExEcurnrE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE
UNmrr STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 188, at 20, 20.
2C2. Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac
Nations (Treaty of Fort Harmar), Jan. 9, 1789, United States-Wyandot Nation-Delaware
Nation-Ottawa Nation-Chippewa Nation-Potawatomi Nation-Sac Nation, art. 14, 7 Stat.
28, 31.
203. Treaty with the Creek Nation (Treaty of New York), Aug. 7, 1790, United
States-Creek Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35, 35 ("The undersigned Kings, Chiefs and Warriors,
for themselves and all parts of the Creek Nation within the limits of the United States,
do acknowledge themselves, and the said parts of the Creek Nation, to be under the
protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever; and
they also stipulate that the said Creek Nation will not hold any treaty with an individual
State, or with individuals of any State.").
204. Treaty with the Cherokee Nation (Treaty of Holston), July 2, 1791, United
States-Cherokee Nation, arts. 2, 6, 7 Stat. 39, 39, 40.
205. Maps useful to understanding the boundaries described below may be found in
ATLAS OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 137, at 61; ATLAS OF AmERICAN HISTORY
plates 60-61, 90 (J. Adams ed. 1943); INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 135, app.
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[The United States do engage to guarantee to the
aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their
teritoreal rights in the fullest and most ample manner,
as it hath been bounded by former treaties, as long
as they the said Delaware nation shall abide by, and
hold fast the chain of friendship now entered into.
20s
The treaty with the Six Nations promised that "The Oneida and
Tuscarora Nations shall be secured in the possession of the
Lands on which they are settled."' ' 7 It also established a bound-
ary for these lands, roughly the Western boundary of New York
and Pennsylvania between Lake Ontario and the Ohio River,
which boundary
shall be the Western boundary of the Lands of the
Six Nations, so that the Six Nations shall and do yield
to the United States all claims to the Country West
of the said boundary and then they shall be secured
in the peaceful possession of the Lands they inhabit
East & North of the same .... 208
The Six Nations ceded land to the United States; other, later
treaties had the United States "allot" the land to the Native
Arrierican nation. With respect to the Wyandot and Delaware
Nations, "[tihe United States allot all the Lands contained within
the said lines to the Wiandot and Delaware Nations to live and
to hunt on-and to such of the Ottawa nation as now live
thereon."2' With respect to the Choctaws,
206. Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Na-
tion, art. 6, 7 Stat. 13, 14.
207. Treaty with the Six [Iroquois] Nations (Treaty of Fort Stanwix), Oct. 22, 1784,
United States-Oneida Nation-Onondaga Nation-Mohawk Nation-Seneca Nation-Tusca-
rora Nation-Cayuga Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 15, 15.
208. Id. art. 3.
209. Treaty with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa Nations (Treaty of
Fort M'Intosh), Jan. 21, 1785, United States-Wiandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa
Nations, art. 4, 7 Stat. 16, 17. In turn,
The Indians who sign this Treaty as well in behalf of all their Tribes as
of themselves do acknowledge the Lands East South and West of the lines
described in the third Article so far as the said Indians formerly claimed
the same to belong to the United States and none of their Tribes shall
presume to settle upon the same or any part of it.
Id. art. 6. The United States thus intended to limit the Wyandot and Delaware nations
to a small part of Ohio. Id. art. 3. Likewise, the United States "allotted" land to the
Shawnee Nation and the Shawnee Nation was deemed to have "relinquished" all title
outside the stated boundaries. Treaty with the Shawanoe Nation, Jan. 31, 1786, United
States-Shawnee Nation, art. 6, 7 Stat. 26, 27.
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the Choctaw Nation do hereby acknowledge the tribes
and towns of the said Nation and the lands with the
boundary allotted to the said Indians to live and hunt
on as mentioned in the third article to be under the
protection of the United States of America and of no
other Sovereign whosoever.210
Chief Justice Marshall later commented upon the use of "allot"
in the treaties and whether it permitted an inference that the
United States, rather than the Native American nations, were
the prior sovereign of the lands. He decided that the Native
Americans were ceding the lands to the federal government, and
presumed that they would not understand the connotations and
implications of the English word "allot. '21
'These treaties formed before and after the Constitutional
Convention, interpreted in accordance with principles and un-
derstandings expressed in contemporary documents (though the
views of Native Americans were not included), do not suggest
that the United States were sovereign over Native Americans,
nor do they confirm an understanding that all territory ceded
by the Treaty of Paris, including that upon which Native Amer-
icarts lived, was subject to extra-constitutional powers incident
to sovereignty. 2 2 In fact, they evidence the contrary. In treaties,
2110. Treaty with the Choctaw Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, United States-Choctaw Nation,
art. 2, 7 Stat. 21, 21. The territory of Georgia circumscribed these lands. Id. art. 3.
211. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-53 (1832) (dictum); accord
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYraB, supra note 120,
at 5; Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long
as Water Flows, or Gras Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAmr,. L. REV. 601, 610-11 (1975); W. Johnson, supra note 135, reprinted in 7 Docu-
MENTS PEATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF Nnw-YoRK, supra note
135, at 958-59 ("whatever words, are usually made use of respecting their submission
[to conquest] ettc: are only to be understood as in compliance with form and custom,
the latter having no just idea of such expressions, and calling themselves no more than
our friends and Allies.").
212. Indeed, the Supreme Court decided later that the extra-constitutional powers
of sovereignty operate only with respect to external affairs and other sovereigns, not
with respect to domestic affairs. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (the
Constitution does not specifically vest Congress with power to regulate foreign affairs,
but the states "must be held to have granted that [Federal] Government the powers
indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations"); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-19 (1936) (contradistinct from
powers of the federal government respecting domestic or 'internal affairs, its powers
respeiting foreign or external affairs, or other sovereigns, did not depend upon affir-
mative grants of the Constitution and would have vested in the federal government even
if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution). It follows that, insofar as the
United States employed extra-constitutional powers of sovereignty to treat with Native
Americans, they were foreign sovereigns. But cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Native American nations were "domestic dependent nations").
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the rhetorical principle of "right of conquest" gave way to the
"British and Colonial practice of purchasing the right of sof
from the Indians. ' 2 1  The treaties presumed that Native Amer-
ican tribes were independent and sovereign;214 being independent
and sovereign, the Constitution could not confer upon the na-
tional government any domestic power over them. In any case,
no treaty could have "authorize[d] what the Constitution for-
bids, or a change in the character of the government.
'215
D. The Contemporary Rhetoric of The Federalist
The Federalist is useful evidence of which arguments and
conceptions its readers would find persuasive. The essays are
not perfect evidence of the original understanding, however,
because they were written for purposes of persuasion with meth-
ods of rhetoric.
21 6
Publius discussed Native Americans in four essays. The third
essay argued that the war powers should be national; a national
power would tend to prevent wars with Native Americans which
individual states provoked or invited.21 7 Essay twenty-four ar-
gued that standing armies in a time of peace were necessary for
protecting the western frontier from attacks by Native Ameri-
cans. 218 Alexander Hamilton added that garrisons on the frontier
213. 1 F. PRucHA, supra note 12, at 49; Report of Henry Knox, Secretary of War,
to George Washington, President (May 23, 1789), in I JoURNAL OF TH EXcUrVEW
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF Ta UNITED STATES OF AMRICA, supra note 188, at
3, 3-4 (May 25, 1789). The report stated that the principles of treaties ordered by the
Continental Congress were
that the Indians are greatly tenacious of their lands, and generally do not
relinquish their right, excepting on the principle of a specific consideration
expressly given for the purchase of the same.
That the practice of the late English colonies and government, in pur-
chasing the Indian claims, has frmly established the habit in this respect,
so that it cannot be violated but with difficulty, and an expense greatly
exceeding the value of the object.
Id. at 3-4.
214. See also supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
215. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889).
216. See, e.g., A. FuRTwANOLER, THE AuTHorrY OF Puna-us: A RADINo OF TH
FEDERAIIST PAPERS 17-39 (1984); 1 J. GOEBEL, JR., supra note 134, at 292-323.
217. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 13, 16-17 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Not a single
Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present Federal Government,
feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked
by the improper conduct of individual States ....
218. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 152, 156-57 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
("Previous to the revolution, and even since the peace, there has been a constant
necessity for keeping small garrisons on our western frontier. No person can doubt that
these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and
depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional
detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government.").
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"will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations" and that a
standing army was needed to protect the garrisons against seizure
by the British or the Spanish.219 Essay twenty-five, discussing
why the Constitution should vest this power in the national
government instead of the states, argued that
The territories of Britain, Spain and of the Indian
nations in our neighbourhood, do not border on par-
ticular States; but incircle the Union from MArNE to
GEORGIA. The danger, though in different degrees, is
therefore common. And the means of guarding against
it ought in like manner to be the objects of common
councils and of a common treasury. n 0
Essay forty-two discussed two classes of powers vested in the
national government, a class of powers "in respect to other
nations" 22' 1 and a class of powers "which provide for the har-
mony and proper intercourse among the States."mn The power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations fell among the former
class;22 3 the power to regulate commerce among the states and
with the Native American tribes fell among the latter and was
more particularly a species of "restraint[] imposed on the au-
thority of the States.'"'2
Insofar as The Federalist is competent evidence of the original
understanding, these four essays do not elucidate the meaning
of the text, but they illuminate the intent of the Framers. The
third and twenty-fifth essays expressed the intent to bring wars
with Native Americans within the scope of the national war
powers. Essays twenty-four and twenty-five acknowledged that
Native Americans were beyond the "frontier" and outside the
border of the Union. Essay twenty-five even likened Native
American nations to British and Spanish territories; indeed, they
were "nations.' '
Essay forty-two, however, did not classify the Indian com-
merce clause with the national powers concerning "other nations"
(such as the foreign commerce clause); instead, James Madison
classified it with the national powers promoting harmony among
the states. This classification might imply that he did not equate
219. Id. at 157.
220. THE FEDERAIST No. 25, at 158, 158 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
221. THm FEDERAlST No. 42, supra note 93, at 279.
222. Id. at 282.
223. Id. at 279.
224. Id. at 282.
225. THE FE mlST No. 25, supra note 220, at 158.
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Native American tribes with foreign nations; the differentiation
of the clauses supports this proposition.22 It might imply instead
that the Indian commerce clause was more significant to the
audience of The Federalist for its internal effects-as a restraint
upon states-than for its external effect, to present a unified
position to the Native American tribes. Indeed, the primary
concern before, during, and after the Federal Convention was
the encroachments by states upon the general authority of article
IX of the Articles of Confederation.m2 Considered as a whole,
these essays did not argue or assume that Native American tribes
were subjects of the United States, beholden to its sovereignty,
or that they were wards of the nation, over whom the United
States exercised powers of guardianship.
IV. What then shall we do?
It is a pity that so many Americans today think of
the Indian as a romantic or comic figure in American
history, without contemporary significance. In fact,
the Indian plays much the same role in our American
society that the Jews played in Germany. Like the
miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh
air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our
treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment
of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith.22
The United States-its President, its Congress, and its Su-
preme Court-can exercise no power over Native Americans
226. Accord Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1831).
227. James Madison wrote:
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly
unfettered from two limitations in the articles of confederation which
render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there re-
strained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate
or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What
description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet
settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in
the Federal Councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members
of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated
by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights
of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.
THE FEDmkAsT No. 42, supra note 93, at 284.
228. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YAmm L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
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unless the Constitution grants it."  Examination of the text of
the Constitution, the intentions of the Framers, contemporary
notions about sovereignty, the records of the Continental Con-
gress, and contemporary treaties with Native American nations
makes it clear that the Constitution has never granted to the
United States a plenary power over Native Americans.
'he only legislative power which the Constitution grants to
Congress is the Indian commerce clause.230 Not even a tortured
interpretation of "commerce" would yield a "plenary authority
to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government"'' 3 of Native Americans, a plenary power to man-
age, control, or take Native American lands without compen-
sation,232 a plenary power to determine whether a tribe does or
does not exist and whether a Native American is or is not a
member of it,233 or a plenary power to control all social, cultural,
economic, proprietary, political, and personal facets of Native
Americans' lives.2
4
Not only does the Constitution not grant the federal govern-
ment such powers, but the Framers explicitly voted not to create
such powers in the Constitution. The Committee of Detail re-
jected, on August 22, 1787, the power "To regulate affairs with
the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U. States."
The sole legislative power was limited to commerce, and only
commerce with Native American tribes, not of Native American
tribes. It never encompassed all affairs of Native American
nations.
The debates resounded with concerns about the western lands:
Would the states retain all of their chartered expanses, or would
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, amend. X; e.g., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("The government is acknowledged by
all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers
granted to it,. . . is now universally admitted."). Compare The Articles of Confederation
art. II (U.S. 1781) (Continental Congress, under Articles of Confederation, possessed
only those specific powers which the Articles of Confederation delegated to it); Oneida
Indian Nation of New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1988) (same),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 200 (1989).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
231. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978).
232. E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955);
Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 574 (1823).
233. E.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1977);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46, 47 (1913).
234. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
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new states be carved from the territory between the Allegheny
Mountains and the Mississippi River? Yet no Framer remarked
the extensive and antecedent "property rights" of Native Amer-
icans already living there. One must wonder if the Framers
believed that the United States already held absolute title to
these lands and could subject Native Americans and their lands
to the powers of sovereignty. The evidence surveyed above in
Part III demonstrates an understanding in 1787 that the United
States was not sovereign.
For two hundred years the United States has exercised arbi-
trary and unconstitutional powers over Native Americans. For
two hundred years the Congress and the President have enacted
numerous statutes that directly violated the Constitution and
have used unconstitutional powers to create conditions of pov-
erty and servitude for Native Americans.2 s Against every chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution itself
vested these powers in Congress. 6 Even when the United States
conferred citizenship upon Native Americans by statute,27 such
citizenship did not defeat these powers. According to the Su-
preme Court, Native Americans are not citizens in a constitu-
tional sense. 8
The implications of a limited federal power for state powers
respecting Native Americans are beyond the scope of this article,
but they warrant careful study. In any case, the tenth amendment
of the Constitution could not reserve to the states powers which
they did not already have, and it was understood that neither
the Constitution nor the status of sovereign vested in a state
any civil authority over the independent Native American nations.
Unfortunately, this article can only be an afterthought. For
two hundred years the majority has intentionally destroyed the
lives and cultures of Native Americans, and these effects cannot
be annulled. Native American culture has been disfigured so
extensively that returning to the original understanding and
eliminating at this time what little socioeconomic support the
federal government extends would further destroy their ways of
life.
What then shall we do?
235. See generally F. CoEBN, supra note 11; 1-2 F. PRUCHA, supra note 12.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7, 102-08.
237. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401b).
238. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); see Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S.
286, 315-16 (1911).
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]First, we can prevent with national legislation any further
contravention of and disrespect of Native Americans' territorial
and personal sovereignty. We can confess the fallacy of a policy
grounded in "manifest destiny," and we can change it. At this
poiJnt, it is the least we can do.
Secondly, a process must be jointly designed by which to
decide how to remedy this unjust and unconstitutional situation.
A committee of Native Americans and congressional leaders
could work out how the numerous unconstitutional statutes
regulating every aspect of Native American life should be mod-
ified. Among other things, this process must allow Native Amer-
icans to choose, as individuals and as nations, whether to be
indlependent of or to participate in the society, politics, and
culture of the United States.239
Finally, advocates for Native Americans can use the research
and argument above in the courts, to challenge exercises of state
and federal power over Native Americans and their lands and
thus to accomplish the ends of self-determination and self-
government.
239. One extensive discussion of Native Americans' interests in self-government and
self-determination is V. DELoKiL & C. LYTLE, Tm NATIONs WITHIN: THE PAST AND
FuitmE oF AmERicAN INDLAN SovEREINry (1984).
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